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ABSTRACT 
Ahsan Kamal: Grievances, Demands and Silencing: The Case of Mutasareen-e-Mirani Dam 
Movement 
(Under the direction of Charles Kurzman) 
 
 
Sociology scholarship on social movements often conflates underlying grievances with 
movement demands, and fails to account for cases where disjuncture between grievances and 
demands matter for movement outcomes. A theory of silencing helps address this gap by focusing 
on the intra and extra movement factors that introduce gaps between grievances and demands. 
Using the case of the Mutasareen-e Mirani Dam movement from Pakistan, I demonstrate the 
existence of this disjuncture in cases where collective actors mobilize to address complex and 
multilayered losses faced by individuals and communities displaced and dispossessed due to the 
construction of mega-development projects. The research uses data collected through interviews, 
participant observation, and documentary archives collected between 2012 and 2015. My study 
shows mobilization can occur even when partial grievances are addressed, and the manner in which 
institutionalized power pre-configures movement demands.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Do you see that over there?” Mir1 was pointing to his right. “That used to be our 
community club. Every evening, we would gather there, hang out, drink tea, and chat. That right 
there is the courtyard where we used to sit, read the newspaper, and discuss our community 
affairs...”  
I strained my eyes to look for any signs of a community club or a courtyard, but all I could 
see were several mounds of mud with some dead date trees dotting the arid landscape. We were 
amidst the ruins of old Nasirabad village in Turbat, Blochistan, destroyed by the 2007 floods 
caused by the Mirani dam reservoir. Atta stopped the car, and as the dust cloud settled I rolled 
down the car window and stuck my head out. Everyone was a bit edgy, given that my presence in 
the village could raise suspicion among locals – a sense of insecurity hung over our heads with the 
ongoing violent conflict in the region. But, even if we could walk freely among these ruins, there 
was nothing left standing, nothing really to see except mounds of dirt and some debris. There was 
absence, a void, the loud murmurs of the haunting silence in a place once filled the hustle and 
bustle of a vibrant and flourishing community.  
Mir continued to point in different directions, giving me an oral presentation of the outlook 
of the village center--houses, shops, wells, community club…all reduced to indistinguishable 
mounds of mud and rubble.  Local construction relied on the use of unbaked mud bricks glued 
together with a paste of wet mud mixed with crop chaff. Tree trunks were used for beams and 
                                                 
1 All names have been changed to protect the privacy of respondents. 
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girders, usually covered with dried leaves of date palm trees or the posh tree. Some structures had 
been built using baked bricks, cement, and steel beams, for e.g. the local public schools and a 
couple of shops in the bazar.  So when the water from the Mirani dam flooded the upstream areas, 
it took merely a few hours for the whole village to turn to dust.  The water dissolved the foundations 
of built structures. Seven years on, most of the material that could be salvaged had been salvaged 
and reused to build mud houses elsewhere. All that was left behind was mud. Though every now 
and then we came across decaying door frame, a half-buried broken plastic chair, clothes and other 
household items peeking through the rubble.  
Mir was now speaking with Atta and Chakar in Balochi, ruminating the loss they had 
suffered. After a few minutes, he turned to me and said:  
“Bus, hamare saath buhat ziadati hoa hai.”    
“We have been wrong,” he said, “and that is all.”  
This often repeated sentence, the idea that the people have been wronged, captured both 
the inability to effectively communicate the totality of loss and the ability to forcefully articulate 
a sense of grave in justice. The loss – of individuals and communities that were impacted by the 
2007 floods, was beyond what could be listed and enumerated. It was more than the loss of houses, 
land, date trees, market shops. It was more than the loss of the community center. But the story I 
wish to tell in this study is the story of difficulty in communicating this loss. The anecdote 
demonstrates some of the difficulty in articulating the loss. One can ‘objectively’ understand what 
it means to lose a community center, perhaps. One can even conduct studies enumerating the 
social, collective, and psychological aspect of losing a place where people gather to talk, read the 
news, discuss community matters. But in the story I tell, the story of the communities impacted by 
the flood and their mobilization against the construction of the Mirani dam, is also a story of a 
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disjuncture between the underlying grievances and the articulated demands of the affected people 
– the muatasareen of the Mirani dam project. Standing in the ruins, I could only think of the 
articulated demands of this several years-long mobilization that had narrowly focused on financial 
compensation for loss to private property. Displaced, dispossessed, and operating in a context of 
extreme violence, the community and the activist of the Mutasareene Mirani Dam [Mirani Dam 
Affected People] were facing challenges in articulating their loss, but not because they were unable 
to provide evidence of their loss. Even by objective criterion, even if one lacks empathy or 
compassion, the story of the loss was etched in the haunting ruins of the affected villages, in every 
dirt-mound and dead tree, in every ruined house and disappeared community center. It etched on 
the faces of the affected people, in their nodes, their gestures, their demeanor, their ruminating 
eyes and their blank stares. But there has to be a register to record these modes of communication. 
The story I tell in this thesis is of both the ease with which this loss, the underlying grievances that 
map onto these losses, can be communicated. But only if anyone’s listening.  
*** 
Sociologist who study social movements often conflates grievances with demands in the 
analysis of political mobilization. If grievances are grounded in underlying strains, sense of 
injustice, or loss, these can be distinguished from the demands of a movement that are visible only 
when collectively articulated. It’s reasonable to assume that articulated demands are grounded in 
underlying grievances, but the degree to which demands capture grievances may not be direct or 
simple. A list of complex and multi-layered grievances is easy to obtain, and abstract or vague 
sense of loss or injustice is not lost on most folks. But movement demands are forged under 
pressures of clear articulation, reification, and the realm of the possible and attainable. It’s almost 
self-evident that some disjuncture between grievances and demands almost always exist, but does 
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it matter? Is the disjuncture between grievances and demands significant for our study of social 
movements?  
In much of the contemporary scholarship on social movements, the link between 
grievances and demands is expected, and assumed implicitly or explicitly. While earliest 
scholarship assumed that social strains directly translated into collective behavior and protests, 
later scholars attended to movement discourses, narratives, and framing processes. But in as much 
as social movement scholarship in general, and the framing perspective in particular, attends to the 
differences between social strains, grievances, and demands, the concern is with the potential for 
the success or failure of the collective actors in spreading their message, mobilizing, recruiting, 
and influencing a positive or negative outcome for the participants. In most cases, the assumption 
holds. The relationship between articulated demands and underlying grievances is somewhat direct 
and simple. But what if the disjuncture between underlying grievances and articulated demands is 
significant? What if the articulated demands do not address the primary underlying grievances? If 
success of collective action is measured in terms of articulated demands, a disjuncture between 
demands and grievances could mean that “success” might preclude the possibility of addressing 
primary grievances. “Success” might even stabilize negative outcomes for movement participants.  
In this thesis, I contend that the disjuncture between articulated demands and grievances 
can be significant yet this phenomena remains understudied by social movement scholars. I 
demonstrate that disjuncture are evident in cases where collective action is concerned with 
addressing complex and multilayered loss faced by individuals, households, or communities that 
are displaced and dispossessed due to the construction of mega-development projects. I follow the 
story of a movement against the construction of a large dam and show that a significant disjuncture 
exists between the demands of the movement and the underlying grievances of community 
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members. By locating this story in the broader context of development priorities, disasters 
management, and conflict between the state and separatist groups, I trace the external pressures 
and internal dynamics that work to make articulation of certain grievances difficult and 
implausible. I term these processes and dynamics as silencing, theorized as an operation of power 
on articulation.  
This thesis uses the case of the ongoing Mutasreen-e Mirani Dam (MMD) movement by 
the people and rural communities in Balochistan province of Pakistan. In 2007, the backwater from 
Mirani dam flooded upstream communities. At first, the local community members mobilized 
against the construction of the dam in early 2000s, but shifted to a limited set of demands for 
compensation after the 2007 flood disaster caused by the Mirani dam. Through an investigation of 
grievances and demands, and by locating the story of the movement in the broader context of the 
politics of development and compensation in Pakistan, the case study demonstrate how silencing 
operates, and how the successful attainment of core demands, i.e. compensation in lieu of damages 
to individual property, is likely to stabilize undesired outcomes for the affected communities.   
For this research I collected data using semi-structured interviews, participant observation, 
and documentary analysis. I conducted interviews of community members, activists, journalists, 
civil society members, and state officials. The interactions between the activists, dam-affected 
people, and state officials were observed through participation in protests, sit-ins, demonstrations, 
talks, and meetings between 2012 and 2014 in Lahore, Islamabad, Turbat, and the affected areas. 
Newspaper articles, official documents, disaster assessment documents, and material produced by 
the movement were used to supplement the interview and participant observation data.  
Using the case of MMD, I will demonstrate that while the movement participants are able 
to talk about complex and multiple grievances which are linked to the complex and multiple losses 
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suffered by the community, the articulation of most of the grievances are silenced by different 
silencing operations. Some of these operations function internal to the movement – disagreements 
among movement participants, the different preferences of local elites. Others operate at the 
broader institutional and structural level – for instance, when local knowledge claims are dismissed 
by state officials, technocrats and bureaucrats, or when the emphasis on financial compensation 
limits the potentials for making other claims on the state and government officials. This thesis then 
makes a case for attending to the disjuncture between underlying grievances and articulated 
demands. The goal is to shift the focus from merely looking at how demands are framed through 
strategic choices of activists and instead focus on how different forms of power operate through 
macro and micro interactions to impact the likelihood of the redressal of the multiple, complex, 
and wide-ranging demands of communities impacted and affected by development induced 
displacement and disasters. This approach shows that people may mobilize because some 
grievances are addressed by the articulated demands, but they may also mobilize even if they 
believe that their primary grievances will not be addressed. It also shows that the manner in which 
institutionalized power allows certain claims to be made, may pre-determine the articulated 
demands.  
Theoretical Framework 
Grievances have been in and out of fashion in social movement scholarship in the U.S. 
Early theorists focused on deprivation or relative deprivation and structural strains (Turner & 
Killian, 1957; Smelser, 1963; Merton 1968). These theories emphasized grievances depending on 
the structural and objective conditions. But scholars noted that structural strains and deprivation 
was not enough to explain the emergence of movements. Thus some sought to explain collective 
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action in the rational calculations of individuals participating in movements (Olson 1965), while 
others studied the availability and mobilization of resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and the 
economic and political context that allowed for concessions extracted from elites for effective 
mobilization (Piven & Cloward 1977). Resource mobilization and political opportunity theories 
dominated the study of social movements, and these worked on the assumptions that grievances 
were ubiquitous and therefore, not interesting for those who want to study why movements emerge 
(Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982).  
Starting in the late 1970s and 1980s, constructivist and symbolic interactionist theories 
criticized structuralist explanation and returned to the issue of grievances, albeit in a limited way. 
The framing perspective became influential in the late 1980s, building on Erving Goffman’s work 
on the organization of experience through frameworks or “schemata of interpretation” which 
render meaningful events that would otherwise be meaningful (Goffman 1974:24). David Snow 
and his colleagues proposed that in order for movements to emerge and successfully mobilize, the 
actors have to do signifying work that aligns their selected frames to make it resonate with 
hegemonic culture, thus calling for attending to the interpretative aspects of grievances (Snow et 
al 1986:465). The framing literature has spawned into a significant subfield of social movement 
studies, with empirical and theoretical contributions (Gamson, 1992; Hunt et al, 1994; Benford 
1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon et al 2007; Snow et al 2007; 
Snow 2008). Through the study of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames, scholars have 
evaluated the utility of frames in social movement processes. The concern here is with the 
articulation of grievances. Social psychological approaches extend the idea of ‘mobilizing 
grievances’ to talk about grievance formation as well (Klandermans, Roofs, Olivier 2001), 
defining grievances as feelings of injustices or deprivation (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004).  The study 
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of feelings and emotions also gained traction during the late 1990s, which sought to move beyond 
the political process theory approach that combines opportunity structure, resources, and framing 
perspectives (Jasper 1997; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 2009). 
Emotions such as fear and anger were brought back into the study of social movements, but without 
falling back to the binaries of rational-emotional.  Scholars sought to go beyond the binary of 
instrumental and expressive movements (Goodwin et al, 2001:15). Emotions were seen as central 
to creating meaning in movements: these are seen as useful in focusing attention, radicalization, 
rhetorical displays, collective solidarities, interaction rituals, disciplining, and group dynamics 
(Jasper 2011).  
But when it comes to the issue of grievances, both framing and emotion-centric 
perspectives have problems. Most studies focus on static frames rather than dynamic processes 
(Benford, 1997), assume that the discourses deployed are simple bearers of meaning without 
influence of broader structures of power (Steinberg 1998:845), ignore the impact of political and 
cultural context on frames of articulated demands (McCammon et al 2007; Ferree 2003, 2005), 
and also ignore the creativity and influence of narratives and storytelling by movement participants 
in communicating more than mere articulated demands(Polletta 2006). The focus on framing 
processes, discursive repertoires, discursive opportunity structures, and the impact of cycles of 
contention on framing choices (Diani, 1996).   
Similar criticism apply to the study of emotions in social movement scholarship—that the 
study of emotions during the late 1990s and early 2000s tended to focus on the strategic use of 
emotions and narratives. Furthermore, the cognitive perspective dominated even in the study of 
emotions (Gould 2009:p222; cf. Jasper 2010, 2014a, 2014b). Responding to this criticism, some 
have proposed the idea of discursive opportunity structure that describes how grievances are 
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formed and why resonant frames are more visible than radical frames (Ferree 2003, 2004; 
Koopmans & Olzak, 2004; Koopmans & Muis, 2009). In a similar vein, scholars have studied the 
impact of past failure and social environmental factors in the emotional work needed to sustain 
movements (Effler 2010), and the impact of ‘emotional habitus’ in shaping the preconscious, 
precognitive, and non-rational aspects of emotions or affects (Gould 2009).    
At the heart of these criticism is the issue of power, how it is constituted and how it shapes 
the processes of formulating grievances and articulating demands. Grievances are not mere rational 
articulations but stem from complex losses that evoke emotional responses and can only be 
articulated in complex narrative forms. The articulated demands are shaped both by internal 
movement dynamics as well as broader cultural and structural factors. Demands and discursive 
claims are also ‘goal-driven’ and are reasonably “adjusted” as per intra-movement and extra-
movement dynamics.  The disjuncture between underlying grievances and articulated demands, I 
suggest, is an understudied and undertheorized aspect of social movement scholarship. 
Power, grievances, and silencing  
A way to address this gap is by considering how power operates to shape articulation of 
grievances. Power does not simply allow the powerful to deny the demands of the relatively 
powerless, but also operates to determine what claims can be made and what grievances can be 
voiced (Gaventa, 1980). As an operation of power, silencing can also result in quiescence and 
establishment of cultural hegemony, i.e. making “common sense” the values that keep the 
dominant groups in power (Gramsci, 1977:258). The response by oppressed groups can range from 
rebellion, quiescence, and a host of everyday acts of micro-resistance against the powerful (Scott 
10 
1987). These acts, the ‘weapons of the weak’, signal that there is some degree of awareness among 
the relatively powerless about the silencing operations, even when they do not organize a rebellion.  
In the context of social movements, the organizing and mobilizing work done by activists 
already seeks to confront power through direct action and making knowledge claims which 
undergird their demands. But power can operate by directly and indirectly regulating what kind of 
grievances are voiced. The term silencing describes the process through which power operates to 
introduce significant gaps and disjuncture between the grievances and demands of social 
movement participants. This process is different from “framing”, which is concerned with 
successful outcomes largely based on strategic choices of movement participants. Silencing, on 
the other hand, is an operation of power that impacts conceptualization and articulation of 
grievances making certain articulations impossible or implausible. The grievances need not be 
inherently vague or abstract but silencing proscribes certain articulations in certain contexts. 
Silencing must therefore be observable if we empirically study the dynamics internal to 
movements and communities, as well as by looking at their interaction with “outside” actors, such 
as the media or the state or other dominant groups.  
For this study, my focus is on silencing that emerges from unequal power relations. The 
presence of unequal power dynamics often ensure that oppressed groups are only listened to if they 
use the frames and languages of the dominant groups (Collins, 2002, vii). Within the realm of 
articulated discourse, silencing can be defined as "a way of using language to limit, remove or 
undermine the legitimacy of another use of language" (Thiesmeyer, 2003:2). This can happen in 
many ways. The paradigmatic example is direct censorship and repression. But repression can also 
be of a “soft” nature, which can be enforced through ridicule, legal discursive requirements, or 
self-censorship (Whittier 2001; Ferree 2005; Walker et al 2008). Another way silencing operates 
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is through an explicit arrangement or implicit agreement between two parties in which they 
conspire not to speak about the “elephant in the room” (Zerubavel, 2009). Sometimes collective 
actors can deliberate make strategic choices not to speak on certain issues (Schröter, 2013).  Given 
the particular context of a movement, some of these dynamics may be more evident than others.  
Unequal power relations manifest prominently in the interactions between development 
actors and local communities and often result in displacement and dispossession of local 
communities. In many cases, especially in the case of developing countries, third world countries, 
or the Global South, state is a central actor in development project and thus the target of political 
mobilization by communities affected by the development projects. Silencing thus must be 
observable as an operation of state power on movement articulations in many ways including: 
direct repression, the enabling or limiting effects of the legal and juridical arrangements around 
development and political action, the everyday bureaucratic arrangements, discourses and 
rationale of development, and the state’s way of hearing and or seeing (Yang 2004; Gupta 2012, 
1995 & 2005; Lipsky, 1980:3; Auyero, 2012).  
In the context of development and social movements, silencing may operate when local 
contentions are based on knowledge claims that are ignored and dismissed by state officials, 
engineers, and experts. This can be termed as silencing by design. The manner in which state and 
development actors undermine local knowledge claims are well studied (Escobar 1996, 2008; 
Ferguson 1990; Scott 1998; Mitchell 2002). In the high-developmental view, formal and scientific 
knowledge is seen as superior to the intimate, implicit, indigenous, and experiential forms of 
knowledge claims by local communities (cf. Raymond et al 2010, for a classification of these 
various kinds of knowledges). This then signifies an ontological clash, between one particular 
worldview (and ontology) based on modern, techno-bureaucratic state, and the other worldviews 
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(or ontologies) that may be based on indigenous cultures and local knowledges (Blaser 2013). But 
such clashes are not exist along a modern-traditional binary – these are visible in the context of 
development practices in the context of advanced and “developed” countries (Corburn, 2005). In 
this clash, the state exercises immense power in shaping the terms of debate, or in other words, 
choosing (or forcing) the frame.  
Contentions around the different priorities of local communities and the state, in particular 
the high-development imperative of centralized state authority, are also sites for observing 
silencing operations. Particularly in countries of the global South, development imperative of the 
modern nation-state often leads to the use of direct repressive measures to displace communities 
to “accumulate by dispossessing” (Harvey 2005) especially in the context of displacement induced 
by the construction of large dams, creation of special economic zones, and resources extraction (cf 
Nilsen, 2009, 2012; Levien 2013). The degree to which communities might be able to resist this 
displacement and dispossession depends on the broader climate of political opportunities, the 
extent of state repression, and the ability of communities to contest the very rationale and logic 
behind the state-led development projects through direct action. This form of silencing might be 
seen as an operation of the powerful development imperative on local contentions. 
In the context of disasters and displacement, the power to classify and enumerate the loss 
and harm also operates to silence grievances. Development thinking is guided by an economic and 
growth centric view that is not best suited to accommodate and evaluate collective, communal, or 
community based goods, and especially the non-material or intangible aspects of value. The 
specific language that guides development thinking often fails to for the many forms of loss and 
trauma, in particular the community or communality based loss (cf. Erikson 1976, for a study of 
these forms of losses). Often the assessment and evaluations conducted by the state or dominant 
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groups can shape the articulated demands and set the terms for the ways in which the state and 
development actors seek to address the harmful effects of development. The evaluation of what 
constitutes as loss shapes the possibilities of articulation, and I term such evaluative processes as 
silencing by assessment.  
Silencing may also operate internal to the movement and communities. Movement 
participants make strategic choices about attainable goals and how best to frame their demands. 
These choices are guided by what is seen as lying within the realm of possible and attainable.  
Furthermore, different relations to power within the community can lead to different priorities that 
match the socio-economic status of different individuals and groups within the local communities. 
Disasters in particular, whether they are natural or development-induced, impact different groups 
differently and the type, extent, and intensity of loss suffered by different groups varies. Thus 
silencing might also be induced by the different priorities and preferences of elites and non-elites.  
This is a form of silencing by socioeconomic class. We can also imagine different relations to race, 
gender, and ethnicity might also introduce certain silencing.  
Power thus operates not only to prevent action or to induce certain quiescence. It also 
impacts in numerous ways what the action is geared towards addressing. Theoretically, it makes 
sense that a greater degree of unequal power relationship has a higher potential for silencing. And 
a higher degree of silencing is likely to introduce larger disjuncture between the underlying 
grievances and articulated demands. Different kinds of silencing, depending on different kinds of 
power, may work independently or simultaneously to make articulation of a wide range of 
grievances difficult, implausible, or impossible. 
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Research Design  
The papers uses the case of the Mutasreen-e Mirani Dam (MMD) movement by people 
and communities affected by the construction of a large dam in southern Balochistan province of 
Pakistan.2 The MMD started in early 2000s as the plans for the construction of large spillway dam 
were announced with construction beginning in 2002. Community members in the upstream area 
were concerned with that the design of the dam would flood their villages. The construction went 
ahead and the dam was completed in late 2006. Within the next few months, an extreme weather 
event in June 2007 filled the dam and the backflow water flooded the upstream areas destroying 
several villages and displacing almost 50,000 people. People suffered a wide range of loss 
including loss to individual and household possessions, destruction of public and collective goods, 
physical and mental trauma, and the destruction of spiritual, traditional, and cultural ways of 
connecting to the community, history and territories. Different forms of collective action emerged 
after the disaster, but by 2009 these were consolidated in a somewhat of an informally organized 
movement with a core sets of demands around compensation in lieu of damages. The movement 
has made significant gains, in terms of getting the state to recognize some of its central claims. But 
as I seek to show, the demands fail to address some of the major underlying grievances that are 
grounded in the loss and destruction faced by the communities.  
To study how power operates on the MMD movement to induce silencing, I look at the 
various stages of the movement. During the early stages of contention, the focus was against the 
construction and design of the dam. Studying this phase uncovers the conflict between state and 
                                                 
2 Mutasreen (ﻦﯾﺮﺛﺎﺘﻣ) means victims or people affected by. This is commonly used in Urdu for victims of a disaster or 
conflict. The movement does not use any formal title but this term is most commonly used by the participants and 
media. The term Mutasreen-e Mirani translates as “those affected by the Mirani Dam” or “the victims of Mirani Dam”. 
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experts at one end, and the community members and activists on the other end – and seeks to 
highlight the different priorities and different understanding of the potential benefits and harms 
due to the specific design of the dam. I demonstrate this through a discussion of the broader 
political and socio-economic context, and the specific concerns and demands of local communities 
regarding the height of the dam and the width of the spillway. The second stage of contention is 
after the 2007 disaster. My focus here will be on the accounts of the various and complex losses 
suffered by the community members. These accounts can be compared with the official assessment 
of the environmental impact and the damages caused by the dam. I also study the internal 
movement dynamics to highlight the different priorities within the elite and non-elite members of 
the community. These internal dynamics are located within the context of the broader political and 
socio-economic context. All of these processes then provide a way to understand the silencing 
operations and highlights the reasons behind the disjuncture between underlying grievances and 
articulated demands. 
In terms of data, I mostly rely on semi-structured interviews and participant observation 
data collected between 2012 and 2015. A total of 36 individuals were interviewed during this 
period –these included key movement activists, local community members, journalists, academics, 
local civil society members, and government officials at the local administrative and federal levels. 
I also participated in protest camps, rallies, seminars, internal meetings, and meetings between 
movement participants and government officials. The material produced by the movement 
including pamphlets, press statements, reports, newspaper articles, and narrative accounts were 
also studied. The official design documents and detailed assessment plans are not publicly 
available, but all public documents related to the dam, the disaster, and post-disaster assessment 
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and plans were studied. The movement participants also provided access to a limited newspaper 
archive, and some official documents that are not publically available.  
The data allows me to construct a fairly detailed picture of the history of the design and 
development of the Mirani dam and the subsequent disaster. It also allows for presenting a fairly 
detailed account of how local mobilized and their shifting demands. The articulation of loss and 
underlying grievances was done through in-depth interviews, some of which were conducted at 
the site of destroyed communities during two site visits in 2013 and 2014-15. The point of view 
of the state and the interaction between movement participants and state officials are constructed 
both through recall interviews by local community members and activists, and through direct 
observation and participation in meetings and events. The various governmental and non-
governmental reports on the plans for Mirani dam, disaster assessment and response, newspaper 
reports, internal meeting paper trail, interviews and observations in meetings and protest are used 
to look at the kind of articulations that are enabled, emphasized, or silenced from the perspective 
of the state and development actor.  
The data has certain limitations. Since I was unable to observe the movement dynamics 
before 2012, I had to rely on partial accounts in newspapers, official documents, and in-depth 
interviews to get at the silencing processes in the early stages. While recall interviews are useful 
for demonstrating what kind of silencing effects take place, activists, community members, and 
state officials alike spoke about the difficulty in tracing the exact moments when silencing was 
most evident. This problem points to the fact that silencing isn’t always visible in the form of direct 
censorship or repressive action. The data does allow for constructing a reasonably detailed 
historical account using multiple sources and the interpretations of key activists and community 
members – thus we have, at the very least, an account of their perception of key silencing 
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operations. Another major limitation stems from my inability to directly measure certain aspects 
of loss and grievances – in particular, the gendered experience of loss. I was unable to speak 
directly with female members of the community due to local cultural norms, and my attempts to 
solicit interviews through male members of the community were not fruitful either. The gendered 
nature of loss and grievances in this study suffer from the male-informant bias. Finally, I was 
unable to access the official design documents, environmental assessment plans, and the post-
disaster recovery planning documents despite repeated requests to the relevant government 
officials and private consulting organizations. Consequently, the ‘state’ side of the story is 
somewhat limited. I was able to use all publically available official documents, some “leaked” 
memos and minutes of meetings, and supplement this with interviews conducted with several key 
state officials at the local and federal level. I also draw on insights from my years of experience as 
a researched and activists on issues related to development and disaster relief and management in 
Pakistan. 
In the following section, I first provide the background context of the construction of the 
Mirani dam and the subsequent disaster. Then I shift to the accounts by communities to present 
the loss felt and articulated by the communities that were impacted by the Mirani dam and the 
subsequent disaster. This is followed by a section on silencing dynamics which elaborates the 
phenomena and its effects by considering the various phases of the political mobilization by local 
communities and activists, labelled as the mutasareen-e Mirani Dam movement. The final section 
provides a discussion and concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2: MIRANI DAM AND THE FLOODS 
Mirani Dam 
Mirani Dam is located in southern Balochistan province of Pakistan 40 km west of Turbat 
city and 200 km north of the Gwadar seaport.  The dam impounds river Dasht 10 km downstream 
of the confluence of two seasonal rivers, Nihang and Kech. The ‘concrete face rock fill’ 
embankment is the first of its kind in Pakistan and was built between 2002 and 2006. The dam 
stretches across 3,080 feet (1,020 meters) and has a maximum height of 127 feet (39 meters) which 
corresponds to 276 feet Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL). A six hundred feet wide un-gated 
spillway provides the primary discharge outlet. The height of this spillway is 244 feet AMSL, 
which corresponds to the maximum reservoir level during ordinary periods.3 
The deep blue waters of the artificial lake created by this concrete embankment stands in 
stark contrast to the arid desert landscape of southern Balochistan where large water bodies are 
almost non-existent. The surface area of the lake reservoir ranges between 10,000 to 15,000 acres 
with the gross storage capacity of 302,000 acre feet.4  Several villages, agricultural land, date-palm 
gardens, and sites of historical and cultural importance have been submerged beneath the water 
reservoir. The dam has also transformed the downstream landscape. Water is stored and redirected 
                                                 
3 The height and width of the dam and spillway have been major points of contention for the MMD movement. These 
aspects of the design of the dam have consequences for the maximum upstream flood levels and the resettlement plans. 
This point is discussed at length later in the paper. 
4 Based on google earth calculation for 2010 (55 square km, 81 km perimeter), 2014 (36.4 square km, perimeter of 
40km) and Relief web’s analysis based on UNOST imaging for July 2007 (63 square km). 
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using two small canals. Consequently, the riverbed has dried up, destroying the ecology and 
economy in the downstream areas.  
According to the official documents, the canals would irrigate 33,200 acres of land, but so 
far only four to five thousand acres of land has been levelled and developed.  Most of the developed 
land belongs to big landowners with the financial means and bureaucratic connections. All in all, 
the official claim that Mirani dam would trigger the “environmental and socio-economic uplift of 
the area” have not been substantiated. Instead the impact of the dam on the ecological, 
environmental, and socio-economic impacts has been destructive and mostly negative.5   
Irrigated agriculture and reservoir fishing are the only benefits listed in the official project 
documents, but locals point to another rationale behind this mega-project. Mirani Dam is viewed 
by many as a water supply reservoir for the Gwadar seaport, which lies about a hundred mile south 
of the reservoir. This strategically important and widely contested port was developed during the 
rule of President General Pervez Musharraf with an investment of over $1.2 billion. The second-
largest seaport of Pakistan after Karachi is currently leased to a state-run Chinese company to 
oversee operations. Furthermore, there are plans for constructing the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC)—a USD 46 billion investment that will connect Gwadar seaport with the 
Xinjiang province of China. Gwadar was hailed as the new regional economic hub, the new Dubai, 
which led to speculative investment in real estate. Mirani dam was thus seen as an important 
Gwadar-centric project, which would cater for the needs of rising population in a town which is 
already facing water shortages. This view is now confirmed as government officials have 
announced plans for linking Mirani dam reservoir with Gwadar seaport.  
                                                 
5 WAPDA, 2007, Mirani Dam: Project Brief, November 2007, General Manager (Projects) South, WAPDA House 
Lahore. 
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Mirani dam is also an important part of nation-wide mega-development interventions in 
the water and hydropower sectors. Bundled together as “Water Vision 2025”, this $33 billion 
investment was launched in early 2000s with funds collected through bilateral and multilateral 
loans, along with significant budgetary allocations. The Vision 2025 was spearheaded by Water 
and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) -- a semi-autonomous government agency that is 
part of the Ministry of Water and Power, which is responsible for the water and hydropower 
sectors. Under Vision 2025, WAPDA planned to construct four large dams, three mega-canals, 
five hydropower plants, and two drainage canals; WAPDA also raised the reservoir level of 
Pakistan’s second largest dam hydropower dam at Mangla, Azad Kashmir.6 A number of other 
government agencies have been involved in these projects. The Planning Commission, under the 
Ministry of Finance, oversees financing and budgetary allocations. Provincial irrigation 
departments are involved in developing the command areas and taking over operations once 
projects are completed. The National Engineering Services Pakistan (NESPAK) acts as the 
primary consultant for many projects and conducted land surveys to assess the environmental 
impact and prepare a resettlement plan. The actual construction work is outsourced to private 
contractors (such as DESCON in the case of Mirani dam), while military run engineering and 
construction groups like the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) and National Engineering Corps 
(NEC) are also involved. Thus Mirani Dam is not simply a standalone development project for the 
benefit of the local people of southern Balochistan, but rather it is part of the larger development-
industrial complex of Pakistan. 
                                                 
6 Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) is part of the disputed territory of Kashmir that has been under Pakistan’s control 
since 1948, along with the Gilgit-Baltistan (formerly Northern Areas). It is also referred to as Pakistan Administered 
Kashmir (PAK). 
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Three inter-related aspects of the Mirani dam project are significant from the perspective 
of the affected communities and the MMD movement: the construction of embankment and canal 
headworks; the development of the command area irrigation and land; and the environmental 
impact assessments and resettlement of the people affected by the dam.  
Figure 1: Mirani Dam Project 
 
Source: Planning commission, Summary of PSDP Funded Completed Projects, Vol-I, 2009-2010 
 
Figure 2: Mirani Dam embankment and reservoir 
 
Source: Planning commission, Summary of PSDP Funded Completed Projects, Vol-I, 2009-2010 
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Construction on the dam embankment began in early 2002 with the approval of PKR 5.81 
billion by the Planning Commission of Pakistan (PCP). Out of these, PKR 111 million were 
awarded for management consultancy to joint venture headed by NESPAK and involving three 
local and national private sector consultants including the US firm Binnie Black & Veatch.7 With 
the blueprints ready, actual construction work was contracted out to DESCON engineering group 
in July 2002 for PKR 4.25 billion. Construction on the embankment, the spillway, and canal 
headworks was completed in July 2006.  
At this stage the development in the command area was supposed to have begun, but 
government officials admit that the progress has been slow. While no official figures exists on the 
area irrigated, local source say that by 2014 only 4,000 to 5,000 acres of land has been developed 
through private initiative of big landowners. This is about 12 to 15 percent of the total command 
area developed in the first eight years of the estimated 30 year life span of the Mirani dam. 
The third component of the project consisted of land surveys and environmental impact 
assessments. Official documents are not very clear on the timeline. What is clear is that NESPAK 
was hired to conduct these surveys, and the local district government were also involved in this 
process. The surveys were largely concerned with determining the upstream areas that would be 
submerged under the lake reservoir. Based on these surveys, a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) 
was created with the goal of acquiring land owned privately under the land acquisition laws of 
                                                 
7 Black & Veatch (bv.com) was founded in 1915 in Kansas City, Missouri, with a history of working closely with the 
US government on projects such as the construction of the military cantonment Camp Pike in Arkansas in WWI (1917) 
and other camps during WWII (1940); on “highly secretive activities” with the US government and the Atomic Energy 
Commission after WWII. One of the founders, Veatch was appointed by the Truman government in 1950s to deal 
with water issues. In 1995 the company merged with Binnie & Partners which gave it access to the Asian water 
markets and expanded its water operations to the UK.  The company has been heavily involved in the development of 
water sector projects in Pakistan, constructing Pakistan’s first mega dam in Mangla during the 1960s and involved in 
the raising of Mangla dam in recent years under WAPDA’s Vision 2025 plans.  B&V is listed on the Forbes’s list of 
‘500 Largest Private Companies in the United States’. 
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Pakistan. The first RAP fixed the water elevation level at 244 feet AMSL – this corresponds with 
the height of the dam spillway. However, these plans were contested by the local people who 
feared that the reservoir would swallow up land at much higher elevation. Local protests, which 
are detailed in later sections of the paper, resulted in a revision and a new elevation level of 264 
feet AMSL was decided. The first survey for 244 feet AMSL was completed circa June 2005 and 
for 264 feet AMSL by April 2006. A total amount of PKR 1.131 billion was allocated by the 
Planning Commission for land acquisition. This was later revised up to PKR 1.688 billion in 
September 2007. 
Local contentions and grievances related to all the three components of the Mirani Dam 
project. Details of these contentions and early stage of mobilization are given in the next 
subsection. 
Protests against the Construction of the Dam  
Soon after the plans for the construction of the dam were announced, local community 
members started mobilizing against the Mirani Dam. The contentions began in 2002, when the 
locals became aware of the design plans. One of the most respected political activists from 
Nasirabad, Wajah, was at the helm of the local contentions. Wajah had been active in the 
nationalist and leftist political circles since his youth, and he had won the local body elections for 
the Union Council of Nasirabad in 2002.  
Wajah recalls that local communities were not against the construction of a dam, but they 
were alarmed when they saw the blueprints for the Mirani Dam. He recalled that during the 1950s, 
a government surveyor named Iqbal Gujjar visited his grandfather’s house and told them about the 
plans for the construction of an 80 feet high dam, and that even with that height there was a chance 
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that after heavy rains the water might reach the road on the edges of Nasirabad village. But when 
Wajah realized that the official plans had increased the height of Mirani dam to 127 feet, he was 
horrified and knew that this would lead to large scale destruction.  
We used to live in Dasht [downstream area] and we used to look at the sky as we 
had rain-irrigated [baraani] land, so we knew that if it rains we will get roti [bread] 
and if it doesn’t we won’t get any food. My maternal grandfather – all the people 
in Dasht, Nasirabad, Turbat, we wanted a band [dam] to be built. But when we saw 
the blueprints and saw the situation after the [potential] construction of [Mirani] 
dam that scared us. Dams can be beneficial. We were against this dam because it 
was more damaging then beneficial. What good is this dam then? It only led to our 
destruction. 
You see, the reservoir has excess water, more than our needs. I told you about Iqbal 
[Gujjar, surveyor]. He said that if the dam height is 80 feet the water will come to 
the road [in old Nasirabad village, not the main highway]. Now if you build the 
dam that is 127 feet high then this will only lead to destruction.   
Wajah and villagers from Nasirabad started to organize meetings and protests, a phase that 
started in 2002 and lasted till 2005 when construction on the dam started and was well under way.   
When we saw the blueprints for the dam with the height of 127, we started 
organizing protest. At different levels. At the level of district council [elected local 
bodies and local administration] and among the general public. We took delegates 
[to the DCO, Turbat]. We wrote to the President [of Pakistan]. We wrote to the 
Government of Balochistan, to WAPDA, to NESPAK – we wrote to all the relevant 
departments, contacted them, pleaded our case.  
After 2002, when the blueprint came forward, from 2002 till 2005 I was personally 
involved in this. In a way I was leading it. We got tired. People went to Gwadar [to 
attend a meeting or public ceremony where Mirani Dam was being announced], 
they weren’t even allowed to meet [the President or other officials]. Whatever they 
had written [petition or letter], they [the organizers] said that this cannot be given 
to the President. They tore it up. What can we do then?  Our protest and rallies, if 
they had accepted any of our demands even once, then we could have gone to them. 
But it didn’t happen, and we became hopeless. We told them [repeatedly] that this 
is destruction, it [the dam] will destroy us, annihilate us, everything will be lost, 
and we did lose everything. 
During this period the community members organized in many ways. First, they held 
meetings with the government officials and the survey teams at the various levels. For instance, 
Wajah and other members of the community met with the survey teams at the dam embankment 
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site and in the community club of Nasirabad. They also went to Turbat city, about two hour drive 
from Nasirabad, to hold meetings with the District Coordinating Officer (DCO) of District Kech 
and the Commissioner of Makeran Division. One of Wajah’s relative and another key figure from 
Nasirabad, Dr. Tariq, also visited and met with government officials in Quetta and Islamabad. 
Wajah also used his position as the Union Council Mayor [Nazim] to raise the issue in the district 
council. Second, community members took direct action by organizing press conferences and 
holding protests, especially outside the offices of the DCO and Commissioner in Turbat. Third, 
they wrote letters to the President of Pakistan, Government of Balochistan, WAPDA, NESPAK, 
and all other relevant departments. And finally, they tried to meet with President General 
Musharraf during his visit to the Gwadar at the public inauguration of the Mirani dam project.  
Another local activists recalls the early days of mobilization, about the wall-chalking in 
Nasirabad against the construction of the dam. He also recalls how people from Nasirabad went 
and protested in Turbat, sometimes renting vehicles, sometimes doing a foot march. He also refers 
to how Wajah wanted to keep the issue of Mirani dam separate from party politics. 
I worked part-time with the survey teams… We had graffiti on the walls in 
Nasirabad [against the construction of the dam].  We did a lot of protest. About 
twelve or thirteen pickups from Nasirabad were loaded [one pickup vehicle may 
hold between7 to 15 people] and we went to Turbat City. This is when the dam 
wasn’t built. We went there to the office of the National Party as well.  
At that time Wajah was the Nazim of UC Nasirabad. Our party was NP and Dr. 
Yasin was also there [a local influential belonging to the NP]. They had their own 
protest. We had people from all the parties. We had done the protest for the Mirani 
dam. The party people came with their flags and banners, and wanted us to protest 
on their platform. Wajah did not agree to this “co-option” that I won’t protest with 
you [National Party], I am with these [locals from Nasirabad]. I am a member of 
your party and a Nazim, but I won’t come with you. We also did a foot-march to 
the DC office [over 40 km].  
There was wall-chalking against the dam all over the place. [Interview: ZB] 
While the main demands at this point focused on changing the height of the dam 
embankment and increasing the width of the spillway, the lack of response from the government 
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created a sense of helplessness among locals. Some gave up, others focused on the resettlement 
action plan instead. This shifting of demands is in a way an effect of silencing, which I will discuss 
later in section 7. For now, I will just hint at how an interaction between locals and the state official 
played out during this early stage of mobilization.  
We realized that the dam was going to be built in any case. So we demanded that 
before you close the mouth of the river, you must first settle us somewhere and then 
close it, we will be drowned. But they said No, you people will not be drowned but 
you are only doing this for money.  There was this one Sindhi [engineer] whom I 
met at the residence of the Advocate General Nazimuddin. We got into a heated 
argument. I said that you are destroying us, he said that you people are lying, you 
are making a scandal to get money. When the flood came, this person was the 
representative of PD [WAPDA project director], he was going to the court [local 
qazi court]. I asked him, what now, were we hungry for money or what, go bring 
your general [Musharraf]. He ran from the Qazi court and never came in front of 
me. 
These kinds of interactions resulted in the shifting of demands. But overall, this also caused 
a sense of helplessness. Wajah, who was active till 2005, stopped playing an active role. It wasn’t 
until after the 2007 disaster that local community members started to organize once again, this 
time largely focused on getting compensation for damages. The lack of hope and sense of 
helplessness was carried ahead as a collective memory, which also played a role in silencing 
demands. Wajah summarizes this as follows.  
We made these demands. We pleaded our case in front of everyone. But we actually 
can’t demand anything. Demands are made by influential people, we can only plead 
and request. But no one heard us. And till this day they haven’t heard us. We are 
not even considered as human, what to say about our rights, demands and 
citizenship, they don’t even consider us as humans.  
The Disaster 
Despite the contentions by local communities, the construction of Mirani dam proceeded 
as planned. The dam embankment was completed towards the end of 2006 and the project was 
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declared complete in early 2007. Within a few months disaster struck and wreaked havoc in the 
area.  
In June 2007, less than a year after the impoundment of the reservoir began, backwater 
from the Mirani dam reservoir flooded several villages upstream and impacted the livers of an 
estimated 50,000 to 70,000 people.  While the flooding was partly caused due to unexpected 
amount of rainfall which resulted in a large scale floods of 2007, in certain areas the floods were 
a direct result of Mirani dam. Cyclone Yemyin hit the coastal areas of Pakistan on June 26, 2007 
and triggered torrential rains across Sindh and Balochistan provinces which had already seen an 
uncharacteristically wet summer. The arid mountainous and desert planes of southern Sindh and 
southern Balochistan were heavily flooded and almost 6,449 villages and towns across 28 districts 
were inundated. According to official sources, 420 lives were lost and 109 people went “missing”.  
The floods swept away 75,626 houses and left 372,000 people without shelter. The damage to 
regional economy was extensive – almost 70% of the crop area of Balochistan was destroyed, four 
hundred thousand livestock animals died, and half a million jobs were lost which impacted 1.7 
million individual household members. The economic cost of damages was put at USD 537 
million.8  Overall, the lives of 2.5 million people were impacted by these floods.  
The disaster was unevenly spread across a large area, and disaggregated data is not 
publically available. District Kech, where Mirani dam is situated, was one of the worst affected 
areas with more than a third of total population impacted. Flood levels rose up to 8 meters in some 
areas of tehsil (sub-district) Turbat. The housing stock in three districts was almost completely 
                                                 
8 IFRC, 2007. “Pakistan: Cyclone Yemyin/Floods” Appeal No. MDRPK01, 12 Nov 2007; IFRC, 2012, “Final report: 
Pakistan: Cyclone Yemyin/Floods”, May 25 2012; World Bank. 2007. Pakistan - Cyclone and floods 2007: 
preliminary damage and needs assessment - Balochistan and Sindh. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
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destroyed – 2,742 in Nasirabad (100 percent), 2,949 in Nodiz (100 percent) and 996 in Kosh Kalat 
(75%).9 
The Nasirabad, Nodez and other areas of Turbat were cut off as the main road was badly 
damaged and bridges were destroyed.10 People were stranded and left without much assistance 
from the local government authorities who lacked the capacity to deal with the disaster. The 
Pakistan military used helicopters to evacuate and drop relief to far off communities.  
The Mirani dam disaster was tucked in larger flood disaster. Official reports on flood 
damages do not distinguish between the two, 11 but in case of Turbat the distinction can be made 
between the areas affected by flash floods and the areas that were inundated by backwater from 
the Mirani dam reservoir.12 This distinction is evident if one compares the 2007 floods with the 
1998 floods that also wreaked havoc in district Kech. An assessment carried out by a group of 
international NGOs makes this observation that the villages of Koshkalat and Gokdan were 
affected by the 1998 by flash floods, and saw similar levels of inundation in 2007. But villages in 
UC Nasirabad, Nodez, and Kalatuk had not seen flash floods in 1998, and the 2007 floods were 
                                                 
9 Memon, Naseer, 2007. Disaster unleashed by Mirani Dam, DAWN. 
10 Anonymous, 2007, Rapid Assessment Report of 3-B Yemyen Cyclone affected areas in Kech and Gawadar Districts, 
Southern Balochistan, Pakistan, Joint Assessment Team Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services, etal. July 2007. 
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A26B880C897149D8C125730F0042EADB-Full_report.pdf 
11 Official documents by the National Disaster Management Authorities (NDMA), rapid assessments carried out by 
the World Bank and ADB, or the situation reports by international humanitarian groups such as the International Red 
Cross Foundation, do not provide disaggregated data and do not as much mention Mirani dam.  C.f. World Bank. 
2007. Pakistan - Cyclone and floods 2007: preliminary damage and needs assessment - Balochistan and Sindh. 
Washington, DC: World Bank; UNOCHA, 2007, IASC Inter-Agency Real time Evaluation of the Pakistan 
Floods/Cyclone Yemyin, 31 Oct 2007; IFRC, 2007. “Pakistan: Cyclone Yemyin/Floods” Appeal No. MDRPK01, 12 
Nov 2007; IFRC, 2012, “Final report: Pakistan: Cyclone Yemyin/Floods”, May 25 2012; 
12 The only publically available document that mentions Mirani Dam as the cause of the disaster is prepared by the 
Kech District Disaster Management Unit (DMU), which relies on two sources. The first is an article by the head of a 
national NGO that was active both during the disaster as well in challenging the development of the Dam in the first 
place on grounds that it would cause destruction in the area. The second is a rapid assessment done by a joint team of 
International NGOs. Apart from these sources, no official records directly identify the disaster with Mirani dam. 
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due to the expansion of the lake reservoir.13 The claim makes sense given the location and 
proximity of these villages to the newly formed Mirani dam lake reservoir.  
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster everyone was focused on relief and recovery 
activities. Most of the people of UC Nasirabad, Nodez, and Kallatuk (areas affected by the Mirani 
dam backwater) and Gokdan and Koshkallat (areas of Turbat that were heavily impacted by flash 
floods) were left stranded given the destruction of key roads and highways. They relied heavily on 
relief provided by other nearby communities, people of means, local and international NGOs, 
welfare organization, and the military/state.  
Community members recall how they gathered on the main highway which was at a higher 
elevation level, but were disconnected from Turbat due to destruction of bridges and sections of 
the road. The military used helicopters to airlift people who were stranded on their rooftops, and 
for dropping relief goods.  But given the failure of a well-coordinated humanitarian response,14 the 
local communities faced a slow path to any reasonable recovery.  Locals staged several protests, 
usually on the rare occasion of a visit by a politician or government official. As time went on and 
water receded, local people made regular trips to Turbat to protest outside the offices of district 
and divisional government offices.  
These protests were in some sense the beginnings of the post-disaster round of 
contestations by the MMD movement. Since the main concern in this paper is with how silencing 
operated on the movement, it is worth considering the range of the loss that undergird the primary 
grievances and of the community and compare it with the movement demands. This way, the 
                                                 
13 Anonymous, 2007, Rapid Assessment Report of 3-B Yemyen Cyclone affected areas in Kech and Gawadar Districts, 
Southern Balochistan, Pakistan, Joint Assessment Team Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services, etal. July 2007. 
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A26B880C897149D8C125730F0042EADB-Full_report.pdf 
14 UNOCHA, 2007, IASC Inter-Agency Real time Evaluation of the Pakistan Floods/Cyclone Yemyin, 31 Oct 2007 
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effects of silencing will be visible and allow for investigating why many of these grievances were 
not articulated as movement demands. 
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CHAPTER 3: GRIEVANCES AND DEMANDS 
Articulating Loss and Grievances 
Disasters cannot be understood simply through stats on deaths, injuries, damaged houses 
and built structures, or the number of people displaced. Neither can we reduce a disaster to the 
economic cost of damages. There is an underlying experiential reality to disasters that is accessible 
through the accounts of the affected peoples and communities. Here’s how people and 
communities experienced the Mirani dam disaster.  
The Night the Water Came 
The floods caught the people unaware and unprepared. Here are three descriptions of the 
night of June 26, 2007 by residents of three different villages.  
“When it started to rain that night [June 26], I was home and getting ready to sleep. 
But then I got a phone call from my relatives who live in Turbat. They said that a 
big torrent of water was flowing down river Kech and would hit the Mirani dam 
soon. We didn’t have a lot of time, about six or seven hours before the water reached 
us around dawn. We tried to move our possessions to safer locations, but we didn’t 
have time. We Baloch have so much stuff that it was impossible.” 
Another residents gives a slightly more detailed picture of the night. 
“There was a lot of commotion [in the village] and everyone was saying that the 
Dam has been filled up and water is coming for us. I went to the bazar and saw 
many women, children, and elderly who were carrying their belongings on their 
heads. It was raining. People had already started moving to higher ground. I rushed 
[on my motorcycle to the nearby highway] to arrange for a vehicle in order to 
transport my possessions to a safer location. But they didn’t believe me and even 
laughed at me. ‘How could the water reach your house?’ Eventually I managed to 
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get a car and we worked through the night to get as much of our household 
possessions moved out as we possibly could. But there was so much stuff [our 
whole household] and we couldn’t save everything. We also had two shops [in the 
village bazar] full of goods and merchandize. But we were not able to save even a 
single thing from the shops. The water started to reach our house at around 3 am. 
At this point we abandoned everything and rushed out with children and other 
family members.” 
Others were not so lucky and were caught in the flood waters. Many were stuck on the 
rooftops of some of the sturdier built structures. Locals from Nodez recount being stuck on the 
rooftop of a mosque for a day. Some were evacuated through military helicopters, other’s waited 
it out and waded through shallow waters to reach higher grounds.  
The most telling thing about these narratives is the sense of being caught unprepared by 
the disaster. The locals are used to experiencing flashfloods in low lying areas next to the seasonal 
rivers and streams. But the backwater floods from Mirani dam was a new phenomenon for which 
locals were not adequately prepared – even if they feared this outcome when the dam was being 
constructed.15 
The shock and trauma of losing your homes and household possessions in the dead of night 
is something that locals were unable to recover from fully. In a public conversation with students 
during a protest camp setup in Lahore, the affected people narrated how the night impacted them 
psychologically.  
About 99% people were mentality disturbed – they were in shock when the water 
flooded their houses, since they knew that this was unusual. When I speak to the 
people, they say that when we had to leave our houses in the dark of the night, we 
can’t describe our conditions. We didn’t have any clothes, any luggage, nothing. 
We just left there and sat under the open sky.  [Chakar, seminar, Lahore] 
People left there, under the open sky, struggling to get by. The speaker goes on to add: 
                                                 
15 Details of these fears and protests by locals at the time of the construction of dam are discussed at length later in 
this paper. 
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As you know, if you take away the roof from someone’s head, then this 
homelessness, we can’t make up for this loss. If you lose something else, if your 
education is lost if you are not educated, even then you can get by and live. But if 
you become homeless than it’s an immense loss. 
Homeless at home 
The shock of the night gave way to a state of homelessness that lasted for years. By far the 
biggest concern of the communities affected by the disaster was the loss of home. As mentioned 
earlier, the housing stock in three districts was almost completely destroyed. In Nasirabad, all 
2,742 houses, in Nodez all 2,949, and in Kalatuk three fourth of the houses (996) were destroyed.16 
Most of these houses are made out of baked mud and the trunks and leaves of date-palm trees. 
According to locals, it took about four or five hours for water to dissolve the foundations of these 
houses. 
Given the scale of destruction vast number of people were displaced. Some stayed with 
their relatives in nearby areas, others moved to the city. Those who had means started 
reconstructing their houses, often by purchasing new land as the pre-disaster locations were 
deemed unsafe for rebuilding houses. But rebuilding houses has been a very slow process lasting 
several years, even for those with some means and savings. Part of the delays in rebuilding housing 
has to do with the manner in which houses are traditionally built – large spacious rooms with the 
compound walls spread over several acres. Consider the following account by a member of an 
influential family from the Turbat area and a local activist from one of the destroyed villages.  
Houses were built on savings from people’s time in Masqat. They were wage 
laborers. One person would send remittance from there to support a whole 
[extended] household. During those days our houses were built from mud, in our 
own Balochi traditional of construction. We didn’t use to measure length in feet. 
We used the trunk of a date-palm tree as girder [support beam for ceilings], which 
                                                 
16 Memon, Naseer, 2007. Disaster unleashed by Mirani Dam, DAWN. 
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we used to get for free. We used to build according to the length of this tree girder. 
Who knows what a 10 feet room would be like [referring to the construction plans 
or estimates on cost of construction]. Maybe it [the date-palm girder] used to be 20 
feet, 25 feet or 30 feet. [Mir interjects, we used to build very big houses]. We used 
to build like this. So when they did the survey, the local people raised the objection 
that the survey team hasn’t even looked at the size of the houses and rooms. They 
just looked at the rubble and couldn’t believe that a single room can be 40 feet long. 
[In cities and other areas] the length of the whole house is usually forty feet. But 
for us the situation is different. We have a lot of land. Even the walls of our [housing 
compounds] can extend to 4 acres or 6 acres [and the built structures also consist 
of very large rooms]. [Interview, Turbat, G] 
This quote indicates several aspects of what the loss of these houses entailed. The built 
structures consisted of large spacious rooms usually built from material obtained from the date 
trees, which allowed for reduced construction cost. The housing compounds were also spacious, 
which allowed for a certain form of protected mobility for the family, especially women. The large 
compounds allowed for several smaller structures to be built ensuring that certain parts of the 
house were open to visitors while others were restricted for family member use. This also points 
to the fact that constructing a house is often a multi-generational investment and depends on 
obtaining construction material from date trees and savings from migrant labor work.  
A small number of the community members had to means and savings to start 
reconstruction on their own. But given the limited resources the process was both slow and 
required settling for building smaller structures on smaller pieces of land. Informants also point 
out that the damage estimates done by the government also ignored the size of the houses, often 
making the estimates on the size of a modern housing structure which had much smaller rooms 
and land requirements.  
Many of the community members have not been able to rebuild their houses. One of the 
main source of livelihood and saving, other than agriculture, was through remittances from migrant 
labor in the Gulf Coast Countries. Many locals whose ancestors were not large landowners relied 
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on the savings of their grandfathers or fathers who had worked as migrant labor in Gulf Coast 
Countries or as mercenaries for the militaries of Qatar and Oman, a common and ongoing practice 
in the region. These savings were often barely enough to building houses and acquiring small plots 
of agricultural land. These inter-generational lifesavings were destroyed with the disaster. Such 
pattern of loss of inter-generational investment was repeatedly referred to by locals and activists. 
Such stories were commonly told in interviews and various protest events. Consider this 
description by an activist who is translating the story of another affected person who spoke at a 
People’s Tribunal in Lahore.  
No one has a house now. Some people had means, they had business or savings, or 
some permanent employment. But this person [pointing to one person] has only 
studied till Middle or Primary grade, he doesn’t have any employment. His father 
didn’t earn any money here [Turbat, Balochistan]. His father was in the Oman 
Army and earned from there and invested everything here [to build house and date-
palm gardens]. But all his investment was drowned. Then it is obvious that he 
suffered heart attack.  
Another local from Nodez notes that it was the dam and the subsequent disaster that 
destroyed their ancestral home, and the stress of this state of homelessness is what contributed to 
the death of his father.  
My father was alive when the dam was being constructed. He used to say that our 
jaidad is being destroyed, our land is being destroyed. He became a heart patient 
under this stress. He passed away in 2008. Everyone dies. But this is all due to the 
dam. It’s not that my father was old and had no more days left to live. No. I say that 
this mega-project, this dam is the reason why my father passed away. [Amin, 
seminar, Lahore] 
As we will see, the demand for housing has been central to the political mobilization of the 
people after the disaster. But the state of homelessness, or residence in temporary shelters for up 
to eight years left many emotionally drained and in state of depression and hopelessness. This link 
was repeatedly brought up in conversations, but not only with reference to those who had already 
died but as a concern for the life of those who were alive and struggling. Consider one of the 
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activists speaking about the psychological impact of losing homes and waiting for government 
compensation on the mental health of one of his friends and fellow activists.  
There is a patient sitting with us in the hunger-strike camp. I have known him for a 
long time. He has in his heart the idea that we will never get the compensation [to 
rebuild his house and restore date gardens]. The stress has made him ill. Others 
have been feeling this hopelessness. Two people have already died, waiting for the 
compensation. They used to say that our land was destroyed, our lives were 
destroyed. Their deaths were due to this stress. Now we are concerned about him 
[the protestor at the hunger strike camp] that he will meet the same fate.  
These description signify that the loss of houses and the condition of homelessness goes 
beyond material dispossession and has an emotional and psychological cost. While it is difficult 
to produce evidence that would demonstrate a direct and causal link between deaths and mental 
illnesses, the key point here is that these articulations and descriptions of the physical features of 
houses and the inter-generational investment point to complex and multiple forms of loss and 
grievances.  
Livelihood and lifeworld destroyed 
The dam inundated the agricultural lands and date-gardens. This destroyed standing crops 
as well as the date-palm trees and gardens. Part of the destruction was indirect – as a result of the 
destruction of the underground water tunnels known as Karez (plural karezat) which then led to 
the slow destruction of hundreds of thousands of date palm trees. The loss of cattle and livestock 
also ran into thousands.  
The degree of this loss is not measureable in terms of the monetary value of the crops and 
livestock. Even considering mere economic factors, the shock impacted different socio-economic 
groups differently. Those who solely depended on livestock or small scale agriculture and date 
fruit harvesting were unable to recover, either forced to migrate out to the cities, or resorting to 
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menial jobs. Others who had some supplemental sources of income, such as government 
employment or small businesses, were able to get by and make the gradual transition towards 
partial recovery.  
Only a handful of big landowners were able to privately invest in tube-well based irrigation 
or repair some of the destroyed karezat to revive agriculture in the upstream areas.  
In Nasirabad, for instance, there were seven karezat that were completely destroyed by the 
backwater floods. A single karez consists of a series of wells that are connected by underground 
tunnels which provide an underground channel through which the water is transported from 
watersheds to the fields. These are collectively build and maintained, and the distribution of water 
reflects the proportionate investment of labor and resources. Built and maintained by successive 
generations, the regular upkeep of karezat is a relatively simple task. But all of the karezat in 
Nasirabad collapsed due to the backflow. Locals were able to revive one karez in Nasirabad using 
personal funds and some money provided by the Agriculture department, but were reluctant to 
rebuild more of these.   
The reluctance stems from both a lack of resources and the fear of the investment going to 
waste. As two locals activists explained: 
Atta: The government gave us some money, under water management department, 
a sub-department of the Agriculture department. So during Musharraf’s time some 
money was given -- for each karez they gave PKR 500,000. Nasirabad only got 
money for only one karez [out of the seven].  
Mir: What good is 500,000? 
Atta: It’s not enough.  
Mir: When we started the work on our karezat, each contributor paid 5 or 6 
thousand. We also provided labor. Sometimes we’d contract it out and hire labor.  
[..] The probability is 100 percent that this [flooding] will happen again. 
Atta: But we should repair the karezat. We must. Despite the fears that there will 
be more floods or not. But people are scared of this unknown fear. Psychologically 
they are affected. People need psychological.  
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The situation in Nodez was worse, since the area was at lower altitude. The water inundated 
the areas for longer, and the karez system is below the reservoir’s normal surface level. While 
folks in Nasirabad fear another backflow tragedy, Nodez is permanently impacted under normal 
conditions. 
Mir: When the backflow water came in Nasirabad, it discharged within a day or 
two. In Nodez the situation is different. The water remained there for 10, 20 days a 
month even. It is at a lower level on Kech kaur [river]. We can maintain ourselves. 
But they don’t get anything. We still manage to get some morsels of food. They are 
at 244 level, but our karezat are at 264 level. I remember when the flood first came, 
I believe, the trees were planted [in Nodez, 244 level]. In order to get the fruit from 
these trees, we used a launch [boat]. People used these boats to get to their gardens, 
climbed on top of the trees and then get the fruits. 
 
The karez system undergirds the whole agricultural economy of the region. Even the date 
trees that were left standing after the floods gradually died as water supply sources dried up. Only 
a handful of large landowners were able to revive their date-gardens by using tube-well irrigation. 
But for most of the people, the economic dimension of loss was immeasurable, only expressed in 
phrases such as “the total destruction of our economic way of life” or even “our economic murder.” 
But the loss and this murder had non-economic dimensions as well, as the date gardens 
were a source of local pride and embedded in the social and communal lifeworld.  
Our source of livelihood was our date-palm gardens. We produce certain types of 
dates that are not found anywhere else in the world. These have been destroyed. 
What can we do now? We have certain date-trees that are more than a hundred 
years old. For a century these trees have been bearing fruits. [Interview, Gichki, 
Turbat] 
Dates were also central to the barter economy of exchange on which social relations were 
built. Those with date gardens would give away large quantities of dates to their relatives, which 
could be processed, saved, and used throughout the year. The social debt could be repaid in a 
number of ways – people would exchange date for fish brought from the ocean. Others would even 
39 
sacrifice animals and hold feasts during the harvest season. The destruction of the gardens not only 
robbed people of a source of income, but of the pride and social value of dates. 
During the harvest season, we used to give away date fruits to people by the maunds 
[unit of measurement, 40 kg to a maund). We used to give it away for free, without 
taking any money. Now when it’s the date season we have to go buy dates form the 
market. Now we don’t have dates for our own consumption, what to talk about 
giving it as gifts or selling it for money. All the date-palm trees are also withering 
away [because of lack of water supply]  
During a visit to the one of the date gardens, the locals pointed to several uses of date-palm 
trees beyond the use and sale of fruits.  
We call this puss [ﺲﭘ] in our local language [pointing to the bottom part of the trunk 
covered with rough fibrous straws covering the trunk]. This is used for fuel. We 
also use this when we have to bury our dead.  This is called kalampog (گﻮﭙﻤﻠﮐ ) [the 
spines or thorns arranged on the outer edges of the trunk].17 We take these out and 
use it in the oven for cooking food, for cooking meat on a grill. We also have several 
uses of the leaves. We take these and make rope out of them, which is very useful. 
The stem of the leaf is called karz. We use this in the construction of roofs. And 
after a 100 years when we need to, we cut off the tree trunk and clean the trunk and 
use it as girder/beams for constructing ceiling. We also use the white part at the top 
of the tree for fuel. Thus each and every part of a date tree is useful for us. That’s 
why we are distressed at the loss. We have suffered grave injustice. [ اﻮﮨ ﻢﻠظ ﺖﮩﺑ ﮯﺳ ﻢﮨ
ﮯﮨ]….  
The date-palm tree was thus not only an important source of livelihood. It was also central 
to the local cultural, traditional, and communal exchanges. Date fruits were exchanged as gifts and 
provided an important source of food. Different kinds of products were prepared for different 
social occasions and gift-exchanges were central to maintaining local communal ties. The tree was 
                                                 
17 “As well described by Dowson (1982), the base of the frond is a sheath encircling the palm. This sheath consists of 
white connective tissue ramified by vascular bundles. As the frond grows upwards, the connective tissue largely 
disappears leaving the dried, and now brown, vascular bundles as a band of tough, rough fibre attached to the lateral 
edges of the lower part of the midribs of the fronds and ensheathing the trunk. Varieties differ in the height to which 
the fibre grows up the central column of unopened fronds, and in the texture of the fibre and also somewhat in colour. 
[…]Spines, also called thorns, vary from a few cm to 24 cm in length and from a few mm to 1 cm in thickness. They 
are differentially arranged on the two outer edges of the fronds while their number varies from 10 to about 60. Spines 
can be single, in groups of two, or in groups of three.” http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4360e/y4360e05.htm 
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also used in many other ways, as described in the quote above – as fuel, construction material, 
burial ceremonies, making ropes, baskets, and other household items.  
The loss then is not merely of economy, but of a social life that is tied to the land through 
a long history. The loss is all but irreparable. In particular, the locals are critical of the dam as the 
supposed benefits, even if they were to be realized, would not make up for their losses.  
 [person 1] Even if we accept that they will eventually irrigate and develop 32,000 
acres. Let’s assume that this will be developed tomorrow, after a year, two years. 
Aray Zalim in order to develop 32,000 acre how many thousands of acres have you 
destroyed. One date-palm has life of a 100 years. At least a hundred years. Even 
our elders don’t remember how long ago these date-palm trees were planted. 
[person 2] I am nearly 60 years old. I don’t even know who planted the date trees 
that we had in our garden. Probably my great great grandfather did. They are still 
going on. 
[person 1] and you [officials/Wapda] were saying that we will give you more 
benefit at low cost. But you are given us more damage with little benefit. You have 
the estimate of the project cost as 2 or 3 billion but the loss may be up to trillions 
of rupees. 
Downstream Disaster 
The last quote shows how the residents of the areas upstream from the Mirani dam look at 
the cost and benefit of the Mirani dam. Even if the project reaches its stated goals and develops 
33,200 acres of new land for agriculture, the loss of date gardens that date back a century is seen 
as not worth the economic gain.  
But did the people in the downstream area fare any better? Not at all. 
The area downstream from Mirani dam is known as the Dasht area. Dasht is both the name 
of a sub-district and the name of the desert terrain. Large swathes of land here are largely 
uninhabited. Before the construction of Mirani dam the local people and community adopted a 
semi-nomadic lifestyle, relying on livestock and seasonal flood or rain irrigated agriculture. Most 
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of the land in the command area of Mirani dam was held by few large landowners, some of whom 
also had land in the upstream areas.  
Speaking of the downstream area and the destruction caused here, one of the elders from 
Nasirabad who also owns some land in the downstream area describes what he calls a “large-scale 
ecological disaster” and the “economic murder of local communities”. Water is redistributed in a 
manner that only the influential elites get water supply. Those who used to rely on floods and grew 
crops in the flood plains are displaced. Small landholders are also denied access to water from the 
Mirani dam canals. 
Whatever it is that they have made [referring to the dam], it is our economic murder. 
The dam is built at a site close to the katche area [floodplains]. People used to rely 
on floods and thousands used to grow crops, raise livestock and got by. Now all of 
them are dispossessed [muhtaj]. The whole area is deserted. There isn’t a single 
drop of water to drink. Hundreds and thousands of acres of land, and no one got 
even a single rupee of compensation. I myself am affected… we used to grow 
different crops and that was our source of livelihood. Now they have redistributed 
water in a way that the land that was previously good for agriculture gets no water. 
Instead the water is redirected ten miles away. There’s the land for Nawab of 
Makran [influential landholding elite]…. That land has water… my own land 
doesn’t get a single drop of water.  
The dried up river bed has severely and negatively impacted the downstream ecology. 
While there are no formal numbers about migration, but locals report that most of the population 
that lived around river Dasht has gradually migrated out. The water from the dam reservoir is 
distributed unevenly, benefiting only the most influential and biggest landlords. Locals estimate 
that only four to five thousand acres of land has been developed so far – eight years after the 
completion of the project. 
Mir:  If you assume that someone has 100 acre of land in that [downstream] area, 
how much of it do you think they can make productive using their own money and 
resources?  Two acres or three acres at most.  … The benefits in the downstream 
area are not enough to counter the damages and destruction in the upstream area. 
This area [upstream] is already developed and it was destroyed.  The government 
said that with low cost they are providing more benefit. 32,000 acres were the plan. 
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In 2013, we went to them and said that, only 4,000 acres of land in the downstream 
is developed. … We don’t have the resources, how can we develop that land.   
Speaking about the situation of the downstream communities, he further observes. 
The water is going from here to Jiwani [where river Dasht discharges into Indian 
Ocean]. All the people that were living in the [downstream] area, from Tump till 
Jiwani, ask them how much they have suffered.  
Barkat: They don’t have water to drink. They used to drink the same water (from 
River Dasht) and used it to for irrigation. 
Mir: They used to drink it, use it for irrigation. Once water would come in the river, 
sometimes water runs out, they used to grow three four crops during this cycle 
between the water coming and going. Now there’s nothing.  
Barkat: Cotton, mash, mong [pulses], all used to be grown using this [seasonal] 
flow of water. What’s left now? There’s no water.  The whole [downstream] belt is 
destroyed. Some people have migrated to Gwadar, others to Karachi.  
Mir: And there are no date trees there [downstream]. Only crops.  
Death of a community 
The destruction was not limited to individually owned property, built-structures, or sources 
of livelihood. The destruction of karezat were an example of the loss of a certain collective way 
of being. There were other aspects of the collective life that were destroyed, which included 
destruction of schools and health facilities. The roads and infrastructure was also badly damaged.  
But a community is not merely defined by public goods. The locals speak of the vibrant 
market place, the ancestral cemeteries, and historical sites that gave them a sense of connection 
with their neighbors and with their land. In particular, Nasirabad bazar was a vibrant place where 
people from various villages would gather in evenings.  
The bazar was very peaceful [ ﺮﭘ نﻮﮑﺳ ]. This person is from Nodez. We are coming 
from Shekhan. Every evening people from Shekan to Uthabad (far off villages) 
would come to Nasirabad bazar. And we used to sit together and talk about our 
issues and joys. We shared things [and there was a sense of community]. But all of 
that is no longer there. [Mir]. 
Naisrabad also had a community club which was an important point of gathering for local 
intellectuals, activists, and community members. The club was also a central location for the anti-
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dam mobilization efforts and local activists spoke about the numerous meetings that were held at 
the club to come up with strategies and plans to resist the construction of the dam. This was also a 
site of many encounters with the state officials, engineers, and survey teams that visited Nasirabad 
from time to time.  But the destruction of the bazar and, with it, the community club created a 
sense of the social death of the community as well. During one of the meetings in Nodez after the 
disaster, one of the key activists Mir was reminiscing about their daily ritual at the club.  
Every evening, we would come together here to hang out, drink tea, and talk. That’s 
the courtyard where we used to sit and discuss our community affairs... 
Mir was interrupted by another person who had just walked into the meeting and inquired 
about another one of their colleague and activists. Mir picked up his cell phone and started going 
through his contact list. After a couple of minutes he looked up and said in a matter of fact manner. 
He used to be my neighbor. And now I don’t have any idea where he lives. 
Displacement and Distances 
Once the community had been displaced it effected the whole social fabric. Distances 
between friends and relatives disrupted relations that were central to the sense of community itself.  
IQ: People had been living together for centuries. We have not known any other 
land than this. But everyone has been displaced 
But the displacement also impacted the communities in very specific ways. For instance, 
when speaking about the date gardens and water channels, the local emphasize that these were 
places of recreational and spiritual nature as well. People used to visit the gardens which were like 
small green islands amidst the dry arid and hot desert. The proximity of houses to the gardens also 
provide access to groups that are less mobile, for instance the women and the elderly.  
Mir: We used to step out of our houses and go the oases [نﺎﺘﺴﻠﺨﻧ]. It wasn’t very far. 
It was easier for women as well. They could get of the house more easily and walk 
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around. Since the bazar was close by and everything was available to it was easy 
for them to move around.  
The displacement also impacted access to education and health facilities. This also 
disproportionately impacted women.  
We used to be all at one place and now we are all spread out. There’s a problem of 
schools [accessibility] for girls. The schools exist in the old locations, while people 
have moved to new places. [..]  Men can go anywhere, but given our society women 
don’t have mobility. That’s their biggest problem. A women cannot walk alone to 
the hospital at such large distances. 
In the context of loss, development induced displacement has many facets. I have chosen 
to present only those that were directly articulated, and beyond the other “categories of loss” that 
have been talked about earlier.  
Between Grievances and Demands 
The loss experienced by the affected communities, described in the previous section, can 
be summarized in different categories of grievances, as given in Box 2: “Grievances as categorized 
loss”.  While these categories do not correspond to how affected people experience or talk about 
their loss, we do get a sense of the wide spectrum of grievances. Grievances as categories of loss 
are neither vague nor incommunicable. There’s nothing inherent in these grievances that would 
make their articulation impossible or inherently difficult.  Nonetheless, most of these grievances 
are not articulated as movement demands. There’s a disjuncture between the grievances and the 
demands. The discussion of this disjuncture is done after a brief overview of the post-disaster phase 
of MMD movement and the core demands of movement participants.  
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Box 1: Grievances as categorized loss 
 
1- Individual or household material possessions  
This includes houses, other built structures, household items, date trees, shops, and any other 
individually or household owned property.  Most of these items have a dollar-value associated with these. 
However, some of these also constitute elements of barter and have uses beyond the market or exchange value 
of the items. For instance, this includes multiple uses of date-palm trees and other trees as timber, fuel, 
construction material, and ceremonial uses.  
2- Individual or household non-material loss  
This form of loss or damage includes psychological and health issues, including trauma experiences 
at the individual or household level. A related issue here is loss of sense of self-worth and integrity. Some 
locals also report spiritual loss, as they felt connections with their forefathers in their ancestral lands or through 
date trees, which were lost.  
3- Communal and Collective Possessions  
Public goods, such as school, health facilities, roads, community centers, and market places constitute 
a kind of collective or communal possession. In the case of the Mirani Dam affected areas, the local irrigation 
system composed of karezat is also a form or asymmetrical collective good.  
4- Communal and collective non-material loss 
 Loss of sense of safety and security due to displacement 
 Disconnection from land and ancestral history 
 Disconnection from close friends and relatives 
 Spiritual losses 
 Destruction of “subsistence” and “Barter” based exchanges and relations 
 Environmental destruction 
5- Downstream areas issues 
The problems in the downstream areas are different and distinct from the upstream areas. These are 
listed here as some of the community members have land in the downstream area as well. 
The Post-Disaster Phase of MMD 
After the 2007 floods, members of the local community and activists worked in different 
ways to try and address some of their grievances. The first year and a half consisted largely of ad-
hoc organizing and lobbying activists involving some individuals from the different communities 
and villages. Things started to converge in 2009 around a set of activists from Nasirabad, Nodez, 
and Turbat city who not only infused a new vigor in the movement but also used new protest 
strategies and tactics and expanding their support base to Lahore and Islamabad by organizing 
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protests and meetings in these cities as well. These efforts resulted in many gains and successes, 
but also shaped the nature of demands of the movement.  
In the immediate aftermath of the floods, the first attempts at organizing were focused on 
gathering donations and providing immediate relief to the affected people. One activist from 
Nasirabad who was central to organizing protest during the period following the floods recalled 
how they organized donation camps and protests since the government was failing to provide 
relief:  
When the flood came, I along with other friends gathered people on the road and 
asked them to come so we can collect funds and help people, because relief was not 
getting to us on time as the roads were damaged. The government wasn’t showing 
a lot of interest [in helping us]. So we gathered people, the local elites [mo’tabar] 
gave some donations. We had nothing, no food, no utensils or cookware. So we 
collected donations on the road. Then we started protesting. We protested in front 
of the politicians who visited and the army officers. We demanded that they should 
make proper arrangements for us. They gave us guarantees, and said that 
[President] General Musharraf directed them to conduct surveys of damages as 
well. They did a survey, but there were many problems with the survey – of 
exclusion and other things. So they didn’t do the survey responsibly. Some people 
who came took bribes and got their own people on the list. All of these obstacles 
existed. When we were protesting, the survey had already been done. But the survey 
people hadn’t given us money – they hadn’t include the damages at the 271.4 level. 
Almost 25% of the people hadn’t received any compensation. Our demands was 
that they money should be given to everyone.  
The organizing and protest against the provision of relief gradually transformed into 
protests for the compensation in lieu of damages from the Mirani Dam.  
At first our friends, Fida Ahmad, Jameel Ahmad, Noor, Wahid Baksh, Zubair – we 
first gathered them together and spoke about our issues. Then people spoke to their 
friends, who spoke to their friends – and we started holding meetings and protests. 
At first we were four or five people who were gathering others. People were facing 
many difficulties and were feeling hopeless, but we tried to counter these feelings 
of hopelessness. We even forced the people to meet with the [damage assessment] 
survey teams and sign the survey. We also went to Quetta [and met with the Chief 
Secretary] and found out that the survey list has reached [the provincial 
government] and Lahdi sb [the Chief Secretary] gave us his assurance that he will 
speak on our behalf. Others went to Lahore and Islamabad. … Then they formed a 
committee, who visited here and raised objections about the survey list. When we 
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did protests in Turbat, the DC says that he had done what he can [conduct the 
survey], and that we should go to Quetta. Then we went to Quetta. People also went 
to Lahore. I organized two protests in in Karachi and we did a press conference 
there. We got our friends together and also had other Baloch [who are living in 
Karachi] to get together and did a protest. We did the press conference with about 
80 journalist. So everyone knows about our problems – they know the issue. 
[Interview: Ghulam Jan, Nasirabad] 
The quote gives an overview of how organizing efforts spread from local communities first 
to Turbat and then to Quetta, Lahore, and even Islamabad. Organizing efforts by community 
members began with holding informal meetings among small groups of friends and spreading 
information about protest through word of mouth. Much of this form of organizing was done along 
the same lines as during the pre-disaster stage. Activists held meetings among community 
members, held protests in Turbat, and slowly moved up the bureaucratic hierarchy – first going 
from Turbat to Quetta and then to Lahore and Islamabad. Many of the activists involved at this 
stage, GJ, Atta, Mir, and ZB had been active during the pre-disaster stage of mobilization but no 
longer had the central figure of Wajah to lead them. But this core group then worked with an 
activists from Turbat, Chakar, who became central to the MMD movement.  
Chakar first got involved in late 2008 when he completed a research report on the Mirani 
Dam disaster, which was later published by a development sector non-governmental training 
institute, Institute for Development Studies and Practice (IDSP).18 During this study, he worked 
closely with ZB and met with Wajah, Atta, and other community members. At these informal 
discussions and meetings, the issue of RAP and payment of compensation was brought up, and 
Chakar and ZB tried to hold further meetings with others. Nasirabad became the base of their 
organizing efforts.  
When I first started working, I saw that people in Nasirabad were active, so that’s 
where I started as well. Since we were a small group, we decided to focus on 
                                                 
18 http://www.idsp.org.pk/?p=475 
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Nasirabad. We were in a situation when the dam has caused damages and we had a 
small group, and the damage in Nasirabad was 98, 95 percent, which was a lot. So 
we started with this and started working with the people from Nasirabad. And 
whenever we met, it was mostly with people like Atta, Mir, ZB and we all used to 
go hold the meetings in Nasirabad. Gradually we started holding a few meetings, 
three or four meetings in different communities. Then eventually we called a big 
meeting an invited people from the whole area, so that we can have one or two 
representatives from all the affected communities. 
During these informal meetings, Chakar and others brought up a host of issues, including 
the issue of RAP, damages to houses, date-gardens, as well as other losses such as hospitals, 
schools. They also discusses the issue of land and actual resettlement beyond compensation. 
However, the sense of helplessness from earlier stages of mobilization and the difficulty in getting 
government officials to recognize the right of compensation were all obstacles that came up during 
these meetings. Chakar, Mir, and ZB speak about several meetings organized outside of Nasirabad 
and among other affected communities, where they often faced discouragement when they brought 
about the issue of schools and other forms of demands.19  
The organizing efforts gave this small group of activists some credibility and they built on 
this to create momentum. In December 2009 a delegation went to Quetta and with the help of IDSP 
organized press conferences and meetings with government officials. In March 2010, Chakar and 
Mir organized a seminar in Turbat which was attended by human rights activists, political leaders, 
journalists, lawyers, NGO professionals, and local community members. The seminar gave them 
more visibility, and helped recruit people from other villages in Nasirabad, Nodez and Kalatuk. 
Chakar and others penned several opeds in local newspapers and held press conferences in Turbat. 
With this work the activist highlighted the various dimensions of loss and emphasized the need for 
the government to address their grievances. While they emphasized the issue of payment of 
                                                 
19 Discussion on these in section 7 
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compensation, they also spoke about other interventions. Given the inability and unwillingness of 
local administration in Turbat to address these demands, the activists decided to pursue the case 
with the provincial government in Quetta. Another delegation went to Quetta in June 2010 and 
met with the Chief Secretary and other officials. Chakar recall this delegation as strengthening the 
movement.  
This visit by our delegation strengthened our movement. Commissioner Makran 
visited the affected areas and within a few days, Chief Secretary Balochistan also 
came to Turbat to visit the affected areas. During this visit, on the directions of the 
Chief Secretary, the Deputy Commissioner made a committee composed of the 
affected people and organized a conference in his office. After the conference, a list 
of the damaged residential and agricultural properties of the affected families was 
given to the committee [made by the Deputy Commissioner], after which the list 
was sent to Quetta. [Written account of Mirani dam, by Chakar] 
Promises were made, but nothing came to fruition. On 30th March 2011, Chakar and others 
decided to organize a hunger-strike camp in Turbat city. Bringing in people from different affected 
communities, they held a week long hunger strike camp. During the first few days of the camp, 
representatives from the major political parties, bar association, human rights activists, and 
journalist visited the camp to show their support to the movement. The absence of certain 
politicians, particularly the Provincial Minister Syed Ehsan Shah, was highlighted in press releases 
during the protest camp. The hunger strike was called off after MMD activists received assurances 
from DC Kech and Commissioner Makeran that they would personally make efforts. 
 
By this time, both the district government and provincial government officials had been 
pointing to Lahore and Islamabad and saying that the delay was caused by objections raised by 
WAPDA and the Planning Commission. The MMD activist decided to mobilize resources and sent 
a delegation to Lahore and Islamabad in June 2011. One of the largest and most recognizable 
Development Sector think-tank organized a seminar during this visit, which was attended by 
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Senator Malik Baloch who is from Turbat and is the current Chief Minister of the Balochistan 
Province. The delegates held several meetings with officials of WAPDA, Planning Commission, 
Federal ministers, and politicians. Subsequently, the issue was raised in the Senate and Balochistan 
Assembly by the Senator and Syed Ehsan Shah. The rest of the year, MMD activist continued to 
organize protests, meetings, and press conferences in Turbat and Quetta. In March 2012, a 
delegation of sixteen affected people and local activists left Turbat by bus to travel almost 1,500 
miles and setup a hunger-strike camp in Lahore outside the headquarters of WAPDA. During this 
camp, the locals found out about a meeting to be held on April 2, 2012, of an official committee 
that was dealing with the issue of compensation for the Mirani Dam affected people, which was 
attended by WAPDA, PCP, Commissioner, Senator and Ministers from the area. While MMD 
representatives were not invited to the meeting, Chakar, Mir, and Atta showed up and the pressure 
from the hunger-strike camp also helped them secure a place on the table. This was a major step 
and victory for the local communities. At the meeting, the MMD activists were able to present 
their case and describe how the water from Mirani dam had caused wide-scale destruction. AT the 
conclusion of the meeting, WAPDA and PCP decided to setup a team that could visit the affect 
areas to verify local claims. On the return to Turbat, MMD activist organized more protests and 
held press conferences to object to the long delays in the survey verification process. After three 
months, a team visited Turbat and stayed for three days. According to MMD activists’ accounts, 
the team verified their claims and supported their claims: 
This team met the affected people and visited the affected areas. These people 
conceded that the dam had caused severe damage and the government should have 
done in the five years [since the damage]. They said that they understood our pain 
and we are like their brothers. We should rest assured that not only would they 
recommend that the compensation is given to us, but they would also lobby for a 
development package for us to provide schools, hospitals, water supply, and other 
facilities.  [account by Chakar,] 
51 
 But while the head of the inspection team promised to submit his findings in a week, the 
delaying tactics continued on the part of the government officials. MMD activists decided to 
organize another hunger-strike camp in Lahore to put pressure on the relevant officials. Mobilizing 
support from a wider group of activists in Lahore and Islamabad, a delegation of twenty affected 
people and activist once gain arrived in Lahore in February 2013 and set up a hunger-strike camp 
that lasted twenty days. During this camp, they obtained records of official minutes of meeting 
from December 2013 where their right to compensation was finally acknowledged. These were 
significant gains, but the delaying tactics have continued and the money has not yet been 
transferred.  
As the MMD take a more organized shape the demands of the movement also converged 
to certain specific aspects of the grievances. While community members and activists articulate a 
wide range of grievances, during interviews, site visits, and public protests and demonstrations, a 
specific set of demands are usually presented in front of government officials, and emphasized in 
the pamphlets and press releases of the movement officials. For the most part, the MMD activists 
demand payment of compensation in lieu of damages. But the damages are specific and restricted 
to housing, crops and date trees, for the most part, while the issue of karez and irrigation is also 
sometimes brought up.  
Consider this excerpt from an account of the movement’s history and current demands 
written by one of the main activists written in 2012-2013:  
Demand 1:  Give compensation in lieu of the [destroyed] residential property of 
the affected people at 264 "level" who haven't received compensation, and to those 
with damaged houses at the 271.4 "level". 
Demand 2:  Give compensation in lieu of the [destroyed] agricultural property 
between 264 "level" and 271.4 "level". 
Demand 3:  Restore the damaged schools, hospitals, and all other public 
departments, and the alternate karez (underground irrigation channels). 
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In the next subsection, I turn to how these demands relate with the key grievances. For 
now, to complete the sequence of the MMD history, it must be pointed out that the government 
has been force to revise the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) of the Mirani dam and has allocated 
funds for the payment of damages to house and “fruit trees”. While local activists report that funds 
have been set aside and transferred, these have not been released to the affected people. 
Demands against Grievances 
The MMD is by no means a failed movement. By all accounts, locals and activists have 
persisted with a sustained movement for eight long years in the post-disaster period. MMD 
activists are also aware of their extra-ordinary achievements and this point is widely acknowledge 
in the ranks of the local and national political, activist, and academic circles. Yet, as I have 
observed, my main contention is not with the success or failure of the movement as measured in 
terms of the articulated demands. It is, rather, with the disjuncture between underlying grievances 
and articulated demands. So how do the demands fare against the stated grievances? Let’s compare 
the three demands listed above with the underlying grievances as summarized in Box 2: 
“Grievances as categorized loss”. 
Demand #3 does refer to public goods (schools, hospitals, karezat) which correspond to 
category 3. But this demand is not related to compensation, and in the post-disaster period 
references to this category of loss articulated as demands is made rarely on public forums. This 
fact is readily acknowledged by the movement activists themselves.  
The public and articulated demands that define the MMD movement are demands for 
compensation. These demands undoubtedly don’t capture all the complex grievances and loss 
described in the previous section. Most significant, these demands don’t address the central issue 
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of displacement and dispossession. In fact, when asked to reflect on the limitations of these 
demands, activists readily acknowledge that this will not solve the problem.  
So is this then the question of demanding what can be achieved, rather than demanding 
what is perhaps implausible?  
Certainly, movement participants and key activists reflect on what demands are plausible 
and which grievances should be left aside. But the main issue here is why certain grievances can 
be articulated as demands and why certain grievances cannot be articulated as demands. I have 
theorized this as a consequence of silencing processes that operate on movements to shape 
articulation of demands. But before delving into the details of silencing the next section, I want to 
emphasize that the disjuncture between demands and grievances is not only obvious to the 
participants and affected people, they also reflect on the limited nature of “success” they will 
achieve if and when they do receive financial compensation in lieu of destroyed individual and 
household properties.  
For instance, many claim that if they get compensation for their agricultural land, they will 
set up a shop or small business, migrate to Karachi, or use the money to somehow migrate to the 
Gulf or Europe. While this signified many creative ways of using the compensation money, it 
underscores that the outcome will stabilize the condition of displacement and permanent 
destruction of links and ties with ancestral land, occupations, and the collective and community-
based aspects of their lives that are enmeshed in their status as peasants and small landowners.  
Furthermore, alternative solutions do exist, and the communities readily present these as 
potential ways of ensuring that some of the key grievances are addressed. These range from 
investment in flood protection mechanism so they can go back to their land, building a new 
spillway at a lower height, using modern construction techniques to restore the traditional system 
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of karezat to ensure that the local economy based around date-palms is restored, and allocating 
land and building residential units instead of paying compensation so that the whole community 
can be relocated. These various options are discussed and debated, but don’t feature as the demands 
of the movement. These are rather silenced through external pressures and constraints that interact 
with internal dynamics to shape the nature and extend of the articulated demands. 
Silencing Operations 
In this section, I look at the various ways in which certain grievances and even the demands 
were silenced through operations of power on movement participants and articulations. 
Corresponding to the two phases of the movement, I first look at the silencing operations on the 
contentions against the construction of the dam. Silencing here is: by development priorities, where 
the priorities of state clashes with the priorities of local communities; by design, where local 
knowledge claims are dismissed; by repression, where potential political action is restricted due 
to the broader context of violence and state repression; by assessment, where the enumerative and 
evaluative practices of state decide what gets classified as loss; by compensation, where the design 
of monetary compensation packages limits the potential for articulating other forms of demands; 
and by internal conflict, where different priorities of different socioeconomic groups and classes 
clash to determine which grievances are emphasized.  
By Development Priorities 
Mega developing projects are often contentious and large dams have particularly been a 
source of contention between local communities and state or private corporations, especially in the 
Global South. The same dynamics are visible in the case of Mirani Dam. Even though many locals 
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wanted local irrigation and agriculture to be developed, they had different ideas on how to go about 
it. The Pakistani state, however, had different priorities. 
The tendency by the Pakistani state is to centralize resources using authoritarian means, 
often under military regimes, and distribute the benefits unevenly to certain geographic regions, 
ethnic and socio-economic groups. Accumulation of wealth is linked to extraction of revenue and 
resources from peripheral areas, resulting in historic under-development and continued 
dispossession of marginalized ethnic and socioeconomic groups. The situation is particularly 
alarming in Balochistan, which is Pakistan’s least developed province even though it contains 
enormous wealth in natural gas, coal, copper, gold, and other minerals. The historic 
underdevelopment in Balochistan is also linked by some to the “military-industrial” complex of 
Pakistan – the large number of industrial, agriculture, real-estate and financial enterprises 
controlled by the Pakistan military (Siddiqa 2007). 
This is the context of the Mirani Dam project. While the official rationale for the 
construction of Mirani Dam was the socio-economic uplift of the local communities, analysists 
and local communities contest this view and point to the phenomena of land grabbing and links to 
the Gwadar seaport. One local activist notes: 
 “Work on Mirani Dam was started by General Musharraf, linked to the 
development of Gwadar port…. When the plan was announced, we were only told 
about the impact of the dam for local economy. There was no mention of the 
Gwadar port or the Navy, which occupies large swathes of land in the command 
area and in Gwadar. 
We knew from the beginning that this is not a mega-development project, but it is 
a mega-destruction project.” 
An activist, writing for a major English language newspaper questioned the very viability 
of the project, pointing to its link with the Gwadar project and the “military-industry” complex.  
“The very purpose of the dam is being disputed. According to informed sources the 
government of Pakistan is constructing the dam primarily for the consumption of 
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military-industrial complex at Gwadar and for the water supply of the future 
population of Gwadar estimated at 2.5 million within 10 years. It is estimated that 
150 million gallons of water per day will be required for Gwadar.” 20 
Most local community members were not against the idea of developing local agriculture 
through dam based irrigation, but had different ideas about how to improve the local economy and 
agriculture. Consider the story of the construction of the Mirani Dam as told by local residents and 
activists. As the project was announced, community members started voicing their concerns about 
the dam design and the resettlement action plan. Their contestation were based on their 
understanding of the longer history of the plans to dam river Dasht. Wajah, a seasoned and 
respected political activists from Nasirabad describes plans dating back to the British Colonial rule 
for the construction of five smaller dams instead of one large dam.  
The story of Mirani dam does not begin in 2000s. Plans for developing the local 
area through the construction of a dam date back the British rule during the 1930s 
and 1940s. The purpose of this dam was to store water and use it for promoting 
agricultural in the Dasht area. After conducting preliminary studies, they 
abandoned this plan and instead opted for smaller dams at five locations: Shehrak 
on river Kech; Gosazi on Nihang; Mirani at the confluence of Kech and Nihang; 
Zaren Bg on Dasht, and Sante Lumr near Jiwani. Later during the Second World 
War, the British were trying to find cost-effective ways of supporting their naval 
based at Jiwani [on the Gulf of Oman] since transporting wheat and other food grain 
from Sindh and Punjab was not cost-effective. These plans however did not come 
to fruition.  
Wajah goes on to describe the concrete plans for constructing a large dam first emerged in 
the 1950s, but these plans were for a smaller dam. However, when General Musharraf announced 
plans to develop the Gwadar seaport, work on Mirani dam also started.  
The plans were picked up again after the creation of Pakistan. When I was in grade 
seven or eight, an engineer affiliated with the Land Survey department of Las Bela 
state, Iqbal Gujjar, used to visit my maternal grandfathers house in village Kunjdar 
of Dasht [the area downstream from the current location of Mirani dam]. He 
                                                 
20 Dashti, N. (2003, September 1). Mirani Dam: is it viable? DAWN. Retrieved from 
http://beta.dawn.com/news/113180/mirani-dam-is-it-viable 
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conducted a preliminary survey in 1950s, and further surveys were done in the 
1960s and 1970s… but nothing happened. It was only during the rule of General 
[President] Musharraf that the project was picked up again, but this time it was 
linked to the development of the Gwadar port. The land from Turbat to Gwadar has 
been allocated to the Navy. [Interview, Wajah, Nasirabad] 
Through this reference to the longer history of the dam project, Wajah makes it clear that 
he wasn’t opposed to the idea of the dam or irrigation development. He considers the 
recommendations of the construction of five small dams as the best possible way of promoting 
agriculture in the region.21  His opposition to Mirani dam is from a position of knowledge of the 
possibilities of alternative designs and some understanding of the broader political imperatives 
driving these development projects.  
By State Repression 
The scale of the Mirani dam project, its links to the Gwadar port, and the general sense of 
distrust of the Pakistani state were all factors that created a sense of hopelessness among the locals. 
But the criticism of the state policies towards Balochistan is somewhat muted, largely owing to 
the climate of fear in Balochistan.  
The climate of fear stems from the situation of conflict in Balochistan. A consequence of 
this historical and continued underdevelopment is armed resistance against the Pakistani state by 
Baloch nationalist and separatist groups. The conflict has a long history with five major cycles of 
violence, beginning in 1948. The most recent cycle began in 2002-2003 and has claimed over 
                                                 
21 The idea of multiple small dam has also gained global currency as opposed to construction of large dams. 
Ak::references to the recommendations by the WCOD’s and other reports/papers on small versus large irrigation dams 
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12,000 lives.22 For the last five or six years the violence has intensified. Baloch separatist claim 
that the Pakistani military has been engaged in a kill-and-dump policy, where the military and its 
proxy groups pick up Baloch youth, activists, and sarmachars (local term for a separatist fighter) 
and dump their tortured and mutilated bodies by the roadside. Human rights group put the number 
of disappeared between a thousand and two thousands while Baloch sources claim that number 
upward of 16,000. The military has reportedly used gunship helicopters, and closely monitors the 
flow of body across towns, villages and cities through check-post manned by regular and 
paramilitary forces. 
The Mirani Dam activists are confronted with the violence of this conflict, and seek to 
maintain movement based on non-violent direct action. But they are careful in not speaking 
directly about violence and the broader conflict. For instance, during the hunger-strike protest 
camp set up in Lahore, some activists spoke at a public seminar at a radical political space filled 
with university students and some activists. After describing the story of dam and the disaster, one 
activists emphasized the use of non-violent political means in staging protests, hunger-strikes, sit-
ins, and other activities. He underlines the non-violent nature of their protest by adding: “We have 
never even damaged a single leaf.” During the Q&A one student sympathized with their cause and 
showed surprise that the movement was non-violent adding rather naively: “Why haven’t you 
picked up weapons against the government yet?” The activists offered no response, but later at the 
protest camp spoke about the insensitivity of this question. One speaker said: “You see what he 
was saying – why don’t you pick up guns. These Punjabi kids, they don’t know anything.”23  
                                                 
22 Exact numbers on death and violence are hard to come by, estimate range between 3,500 to 11,375 civilian fatalities 
since the start of the current phase of the conflict. www.ozy.com/acumen/balochistan-the-bloodiest-war-youve-never-
heard-of   
23 Most Pakistanis don’t know much about Balochistan in general, much less about Turbat and Mirani dam. Another 
activist at the hunger-strike camp jokes – “When they [students] asked me where I am from, I said Turbat. He said ‘it 
must be very cold there, I hear Quetta is covered in snow.’ Turbat is so far away from Quetta. It is the hottest area of 
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In public protests, especially outside of Balochistan, the activists stick to the issue of 
compensation even limiting their critique of mega-development in Balochistan. Public statements 
and press releases are also edited to take out any references to violence. For instance, during the 
same protest camp in Lahore activists were going over a jointly written press release. The 
concluding paragraph refers to the non-violent aspect of the Mutasareen movement, adding how 
the violent context of Balochistan with the sectarian violence against Hazara Shia in Quetta and 
the violence of the military against Baloch youth activists. One of the key activists from Turbat 
requested that all references to the violence in Balochistan be removed. The violence is palpable, 
intimate, personally experienced, yet it cannot be spoken about. 
This form of “self-censorship” suggests a certain kind of soft repression and impacts not 
only what can be spoken about, but how. For instance, local activists cannot use the same critical 
discourse of state repression and underdevelopment which is used by separatist militant groups to 
classify Pakistan as a colonial state. Activists also speak about their encounters with state officials, 
even when they are being “sympathetic” to their demands of compensation, admonish activists not 
to use “anti-dam” or “anti-development” rhetoric.24 For instance, recalling a 2012 visit by an 
official commission set up by the government to the affected areas, one activists noted how he was 
admonished not to speak against the dam in general.  
“The Commission member … fully understood our situation, gave us assurances, 
and accepted that mistakes were made by the rulers and bureaucrats. He 
acknowledged that before this day he had been unaware of the devastation caused 
by Mirani dam.  Addressing me specifically, he said that I should not oppose dams 
in general, because I give the impression that I am against big dams. He said that a 
lot of money had been spent on the construction of this dam ‘Benefit from it. Live 
                                                 
Pakistan.” But mere geography is not the only issue. Knowledge about the conflict is limited, diagnosis about its 
problem even more so. For many in the center peripheries don’t matter. 
24 Interviews with Chakar, Wajah, Mir; Interview with WAPDA officials and PC; Activists’ account of their encounter 
with state officials in “the story of Mutasareen-e Mirani dam” report.  
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in harmony. We are all Muslims and if one Muslim is hurt this is felt by all 
Muslims.” [Chakar] 
This description has several elements that demonstrates aspects of silencing. First, it shows 
the willingness of the government to accept that Mirani dam caused the destruction, but it 
emphasizes that the project in itself was beneficial and there shouldn’t be any opposition to the 
dam. While there’s no direct threat mentioned here, but the reference to religion and the 
brotherhood among Muslims has a broader significance. Visiting Turbat city and parts of southern 
Balochistan, one can see graffiti and wall-chalking by both the separatists and the military. The 
separatists and their sympathizers usually write anti-Pakistan graffiti, calling it a colonial state and 
those who support the Pakistani government as traitors. The military on the other hand uses graffiti 
consisting of Quranic verses and Hadiths that emphasize that Muslims should not fight among 
themselves and live in peace and harmony. Verses commonly found on the walls of Turbat city 
include verse hold tight the rope of Allah and do not be divided among yourself (Quran 3:103), 
and the famous hadith, "A Muslim is a brother of another Muslim, so he should not oppress him.” 
This discourse is consistent with the nationalist imagination of Pakistan which sees Islam as the 
basis for national unity, dismissing claims of regional and ethnic historical and cultural 
independence. 
Two more instances of encounters were told by activists based in Lahore and Islamabad 
who were helping the local activists organize meetings and protest camps. During a meeting with 
the Public Relations representative of WAPDA, one activist recalled being told that anti-dam 
rhetoric was against the interest of the Pakistani state, and the MMD activist must stick to their 
legitimate demands of compensation rather than talking about the problems of the dam. In another 
incident, an activist recalls an encounter with a senior bureaucrat at the Planning Commission of 
Pakistan when he was accompanying two other MMD activists. The activist was a public employ 
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himself, and was asked why he was supporting the Baloch, and told that this could have 
consequences for his job.  
Overall, the broader context of state repression in Balochistan and the sensitivity of the 
issues of large dams, coupled with state priorities towards development, create a climate of fear 
and caution among the Mirani dam activists. This shows a form of “soft repression” and silencing 
operates to limit how activists can make a case for their cause through ha critique of the state’s 
repressive practices tied to the underdevelopment in Balochistan. For their part, the state officials 
also directly tell the locals to stick to the issue of demanding compensation. 
By Design - Silencing Local Knowledge Claims 
The design of the dam was a major source of contention during the pre-disaster stage of 
the MMD movement. Community members and water activists had started raising their concerns 
about the design of the dam and the resettlement plans soon after the project was announced. While 
there was some local support for the construction of the dam, locals were concerned that the dam 
would wreak havoc in the upstream areas. Locals also believed that the situation could be 
ameliorated by making modifications in the height of the dam.  
Wajah recalls these early days and speaks about their specific demands – reducing the 
height of the dam to 80 feet and doubling the width of the spillway.  
Iqbal Gujjar [engineer with Las Bela survey department] had said that if the height 
is kept at 127 feet, the backflow water will reach the main highway and will destroy 
all of Nasirabad. […] 
The current design of the Mirani dam has a height of 127 feet but the previous plans 
kept the maximum height of dam to 80 feet. Furthermore, the width of the spillway 
has been kept at 600 feet which is not sufficient for the discharge of surplus water. 
When we became aware of these plans, we knew that this [dam] will destroy us. So 
we started protesting.  
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On questioning how can he be certain that this difference in height of the dam and the width 
of the spillway was so harmful, Wajah pointed out this knowledge was based on both local 
experience and awareness of what earlier design experts had said. The experts, he contended, came 
from areas of Punjab where the weather patterns and geography was different and perhaps more 
suited for the kind of dam they wanted to construct. These ‘outsider’, Wajah contended, were not 
aware of local conditions. 
These engineers [of Mirani dam] came from Punjab. They were not aware of the 
local geography or weather. In the first few years after work began on Mirani dam, 
the area was in drought and that’s what they say. We told them that you are not 
locals. You should have asked us. Our experience, the experiences of our elders 
[should have been taken into account. But they did not listen to us. They should 
have involved the local people in the design and development of the project. They 
had no awareness of the local weather, the land, and the ups and downs. 
Furthermore, if they stop all the water here it will have serious consequences for 
people in the downstream area. They will have no access to water. They would be 
forced to migrate.  
Thus a combination of local experiential knowledge and knowledge of past official surveys 
and design is the evidence presented by locals who are in opposition to the dam. These concerns 
were however silenced and the construction of the dam went ahead. Another local resident noted: 
We told the builders and engineers that sometimes when it rains water levels reach 
Nasirabad village. But this is the natural ebb and flow of the river. Water recedes 
quickly. But if the dam is constructed, it will prevent the water from receding. But 
the engineers dismissed our concerns and told us that they had scientifically studied 
the geography and the water flow data, and they knew things better than the locals 
and the dam will benefit the local people. They further added that the compensation 
that was already being given for land was already more than what was just, since 
there was no water there anyways. 
In response, Wajah told them that they had come there to build the dam without 
any local consent. We haven’t asked for the dam. We are satisfied with seasonal 
rains. You talk of benefits but what you are doing will destroy our lives.  
The tendency to dismiss experience based local knowledge is a manifestation how the 
knowledge claims of state bureaucrats and engineers are deemed as “scientific” while local 
contentions are considered as based on anecdotes that are not seen as knowledge or evidence. 
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Furthermore, the tactic of ridiculing locals is also used. This is evident in the early years of dam 
construction when the area was faced with drought-like conditions – a fact that was used by the 
engineers and builders as evidence against local claims. 
When the work on the dam started, for two years we did not receive a lot of rain. 
So the water levels in Kech and Nihang was very low. This is something that the 
engineers repeatedly asserted. They used to taunt us, laugh at us. 
Another resident/activist shared these views. 
Since we didn’t have a lot of rain during the early years, whenever we would hold 
a protest or a meeting with the project personnel, they would mock us. They would 
say that we should not complain as our fears were baseless. Instead, it is them who 
should be complaining as they were building a huge dam which won’t even get 
filled due to low rainfall. 
Nonetheless, such local knowledge claims were the basis on which local communities start 
to organize protests and held press conferences in the villages and outside the district government 
office in Turbat. They held meetings with government officials and Members of National 
Assembly (MNA), Members of Provincial Assembly (MPA), and Senators from the area. 
Delegates went to the provincial capital Quetta to present their concerns to the Chief Secretary to 
the Provincial Government,25 and also met with officials and sympathizers alike in Lahore and 
Islamabad. 
Eventually though, it was the fact of the disaster itself that validated the claims of the local 
communities. As a local activist recalled, the WAPDA officials were constantly trying to counter 
their claims by classifying their demands as “doing politics.” But after the disaster, they had no 
such excuses, and would literally flee the scene when confronted by local activists.26 
                                                 
25 The highest civil servant at the provincial level.  
26 The term “doing politics” – ﺎﻧﺎﮑﻤﭼ ﺖﺳﺎﯿﺳ is often used in a derogatory manner signifying some form of scheming for 
the sake of selfish and personal gains.  
64 
We realized that the dam was going to be built in any case. So we demanded that 
before you close the mouth of the river, you must first settle us somewhere and then 
close it, we will be drowned. But they [from the office of the Project Director, 
WAPDA] said no. They said that we were “doing politics”, that we will not be 
drowned but were only making a fuss to get money. There was this one Sindhi 
Engineer who I met at the resident of the [current] Advocate General Nazimuddin. 
We got into a heated argument. I told him that ‘you are destroying us.’ He said that 
‘you people are lying, you are making a scandal to get money.’ When the flood 
came, I saw him at the Qazi court [local civic courts]. He was representative 
[WAPDA, in a case regarding land dispute]. I stopped him and asked, ‘what now? 
Were we hungry for money or what? Go bring your general [President Musharraf].’ 
He ran out of the Qazi court and disappeared and I have never seen him since. 
[Interview, Barkat, 2014] 
These activities resulted in some positive impact. First, it highlighted the issue at the 
national level and gained support of development experts and high level bureaucrats.27 Several 
articles were published in the local and national newspapers –the writers borrowed from the 
arguments of Wajah and other local activists. In the post-disaster period, the activists and locals 
regularly referred to these articles during their rallies and meetings, thus using the authority of the 
expert and bureaucrat to support their own arguments. The second impact was the modification of 
the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). Some details of the RAP were mentioned earlier. The 
government plans at first indicated land acquisition plans for up to the elevation of 244 feet AMSL 
for the dam reservoir – this elevation corresponded with the height of the dam spillway. These 
plans were later revised.  
Wajah recalls the events that lead to the change. After the first couple of years of dry 
seasons and low rainfall, the area received higher rain in 2004.  This prompted the engineers and 
survey people to reconsider their plans. Wajah recalls: 
In 2004 there were heavy rains. After that a survey team planned to visit Nasirabad. 
During the visit, I asked the engineer what he thought about the water scarcity 
problem. He denied that he had ever said anything to that effect. When the team 
had visited the area, the head of the official delegation asked his staff to point him 
                                                 
27 Reference to articles by Naseer Memon and Dashti. 
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the marker for 244 level. They pointed in the distance towards the area what was 
flooded with water. This was shocking for him. He then told them to put a new 
marker beyond the water, which raised the level to 252 feet.  
This arbitrary revision of elevation level from 244 feet AMSL to 252 feet AMLS was later 
revised to 264 feet AMSL after a fresh survey was conducted by NESPAK in 2005-2006. There’s 
no mention of why this new level was set at 264 feet AMSL. The height of the spillway is 244 
feet, and the height of the dam is 276 feet AMSL. Since I wasn’t able to gain access to NESPAK 
surveys, and no rationale behind these revisions in expected flood level is given, it is hard to say 
why these seemingly arbitrary revisions were made. As we’ll see, the backwater flow from the 
Mirani dam exceeded the 264 feet AMSL mark and reached 271.4 feet AMSL according to official 
estimates.28 
These changes were not what the locals had demanded. Locals had wanted the dam to be 
built at a lower height and a wider spillway. But dam construction went ahead as planned. The oral 
histories and claims to local knowledge based on historical experiences of the terrain and weather 
patterns were silenced, ignored, and dismissed. The testimonies were not granted the status of 
scientific or factual evidence, neither was there any mechanism to incorporate local knowledge 
based contention. Instead when locals voiced their concerns, they were mocked and ridiculed by 
the official engineers and technocrats. Thus during the early stages of MMD, they participant faced 
silencing stemming from a combination of non-inclusive nature of the development projects, direct 
state repression, and the ridicule of local knowledge claims.  
 
                                                 
28 Request for interviews with the engineers and consulting firms have been denied. Official bureaucrats, when 
interview, only provide a vague answer of the survey being done ‘scientifically’.   
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By Assessment 
Another important manner in which silencing operates is how the state makes assessments 
about the potential and actual impacts of loss in the context of development and disaster. Given 
that the institutional and discursive arrangements of power (state institutions, representativeness, 
discourses of development) shape demand articulation, it is also worth looking at what the 
government “enables” through its own promises, plans and policies. The role of assessment in 
silencing is somewhat ambiguous. And as my discussion demonstrates, the shifting discourses and 
institutional arraignments around development, disasters, and recovery opens up the potential for 
articulating certain kinds of grievances as demands. To the extent that MMD activists were 
successful at doing so is a function of the ability of a stand-alone movement to influence the 
broader discursive and institutional arrangements of development, as well as making use of the 
“new” forms of enabling conditions.   
A brief overview of post-disaster procedures in Pakistan will help identify the manner in 
which disasters are “seen” and handled by the state and development actors. Historically, disaster 
response in Pakistan is overseen by the district commissioner or other district and division level 
government officials, who work with other departments such as health, education, public works, 
buildings & roads, and the revenue department to address various aspect of relief and 
reconstruction. The revenue department is involved in assessment of loss and damages, in 
particular when it comes to loss of private property. In terms of relief and recovery, provincial and 
district governments can legally request the military to step in and provide support. Given the 
general lack of capacity of civilian governments and departments to deal with disasters of large 
magnitude, the military is almost always called in cases of large-scale disasters. The military may 
also provide manpower for conducting damage assessment surveys, and has been part of the post-
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disaster development and recovery efforts. One of the ways in which government tries to mitigate 
the long-term impact of disaster is by giving out cash compensation to the affected people. These 
assessment and distribution of cash compensation are mostly handled by the revenue department 
at the district level.  
While the disaster response mechanism still operates in the same manner, things changed 
in after the 2005 Earthquake in northeastern parts of Pakistan and Kashmir. For the concerns of 
this paper, few of the changes must be pointed out. First, the Pakistani government gave a bigger 
role to international humanitarian and development actors and international finance institutions 
both in terms of the assessment of damages, and actual implementation of post-disaster plans. The 
IFIs such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank usually conduct rapid Damage and 
Needs Assessment (DNA) surveys in the aftermath of disasters, estimating the cost of damages 
and rebuilding efforts. The DNA usually form the basis of post-disaster relief and reconstruction 
efforts. Based on these DNA’s the government of Pakistan made financial aid appeals to bilateral 
and multilateral donors. Given a shift in the broader development discourse away from “economic 
growth” to “human”, “participatory”, and “sustainable” development –the DNA assessment also 
demonstrate a shift, at least in principle, from a cash compensation only model.  
In the context of the 2007 floods, the Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA) survey 
provides an important documentation of how the loss were assessed. This survey details different 
kinds of damages and cost of recovery.29  The details of this assessment are given in the appendix. 
The damages are classified as housing, sources of livelihood, water and sanitation, environmental 
                                                 
29 The report by the World Bank has detailed sections on economic aspects, livelihood, governance, but gives little 
attention to the “social” and “environmental” impacts. World Bank. 2007. Pakistan - Cyclone and floods 2007: 
Preliminary Damage and Needs assessment - Balochistan and Sindh. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/10/16449395/pakistan-cyclone-floods-2007-preliminary-damage-
needs-assessment--brbalochistan-sindh 
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and social impact. For the most part though, the cost of reconstruction and damages is largely 
restricted to things that can have a dollar value against them– while the document acknowledges 
environmental and social losses, one can see that these are not taken seriously. The priorities are 
also clear when one looks at the space afforded to the various kinds of damages. While “sector-
wise” damages such as health, education, and transportation each span over six pages of text, only 
half a page is given to “social aspects”.  
Consider how something like psychological shock and trauma is dealt with in these 
assessments: 
“Psychological shock and trauma: The shock and trauma of a natural calamity is 
likely to affect a considerable number of people, particularly children (especially 
single parent children and orphans), pregnant women and elderly. They would 
require counseling and emotional support to overcome the shock and trauma. ” 
(p17) 
While trauma and psychological shock is acknowledged, it is ambiguously reduced to 
“natural calamity” and a generic suggestion of “counseling and emotional support” is given. There 
are no details of the cost of these services, neither any indication of the actual impact of this form 
of trauma.  
Furthermore, the DNA does not mention displacement, destruction of public space, and the 
destruction of communal and collective ways of being. The report also excludes “anecdotal 
evidence and post-disaster experience of similar nature,” form the possible sources of data that 
would help in assessment of the social impact.30 If such losses are not even classified and 
recognized by the state and IFI led assessment, then to articulate these grievances as demands will 
put an additional burden on the locals and communities. The movement will need to demand that 
                                                 
30 It then goes on to talk about “security for women and girls”, noting issues of privacy and mobility of women, even 
in relief camps;  “unattended children,” which is not seen as a big issue due to low numbers; “single-headed 
households”, which recommends collecting more district-level data; “shock and trauma”. 
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such claims be recognized. These kinds of contestation are made by various movements across the 
globe, and a comparative analysis would provide a way of separating the cases where such 
demands are silenced and cases where such demands can still be made.  
But in the context of the Mirani Dam disaster, a source of hope and, subsequently, the 
target of political contention was the recording of loss as damages in the various surveys that were 
being conducted by different humanitarian actors.31 This is a fact that activists and affected 
community members referred to. One member of Nasirabad community recounted how they were 
running around after survey teams to get his livestock “registered” in the early days after the 
disaster. The person had himself been part of the earlier survey conducted before the construction 
of the dam and seemed more aware then others about the significance of these surveys. He 
mentioned how he also urged his relatives and friends to go after the DNA survey teams and 
register their losses – the implication being that what is not registered cannot be demanded.  
As noted above, the DNA assessment itself ignored certain kinds of losses, focusing 
primarily on the monetizable individual or household level items. The health and psychological 
impacts re referred to, but no real assessment is provided. Furthermore, these early assessments 
also fail to capture the long-term effects of displacement and dispossession caused by the Mirani 
dam disaster. And while some activists spoke about assessments and the government 
pronouncements after the disaster about reconstruction and rehabilitation, they did not formulate 
these other losses as core demands. One reason for this is the focus on compensation as per the 
Resettlement Action Plan of the Mirani dam. Let’s consider this aspect now. 
                                                 
31 Interview, GJ, new Nasirabad, 2014 
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The Politics of Compensation 
The core demands of the MMD movement revolves around compensation in lieu of 
damages to houses and date-palm trees. These demands are actually rooted in pre-disaster 
mobilization efforts. While the communities had failed at getting their original demands being 
accepted, they were able to gain some ground in terms of changing some aspects of the 
Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). RAP was part of the required Environmental Impact Assessment 
carried out for development projects. In the case of Mirani Dam, the plan envisioned resettling 
communities that would be submerged in the reservoir, which was official deemed to reach a 
maximum height of 244 feet AMSL. Collective action by the communities was able to get this 
level revised first to 264 feet AMSL, and later to 271.2 feet AMSL. Claims made on the basis of 
RAP have a better “legal standing” when compared with claims based on the government’s 
announcement regarding the post-disaster relief and reconstruction efforts.32 The RAP is based on 
federal and provincial laws and rules, along with policies by IFIs.33   
For local activists and affected communities, this manifested in claiming the identity as 
mutasareene Mirani dam (ﻢﯾڈ ﯽﻧاﺮﯿﻣ ِﻦﯾﺮﺛﺎﺘﻣ), or the people affected by the Mirani Dam. This 
distinguishes them from the sailab zadgan (نﺎﮔدز بﻼﯿﺳ), or the people affected by the floods in 
general.34 The distinction allowed the MMD to focus on RAP claims, and make renewed efforts 
                                                 
32 These points are clearly articulated by the broader group of activist, journalist, and lawyers that have supported the 
movement, but are not locals from the Turbat area. The author has personal experience of working in post-disaster 
government policy and plans. Cheema, M 2006, 'Forgotten Lessons: One Year After The Earthquake', South Asian 
Journal, vol. 14; Interview, Mushtaq Gaadi, Dec 2014; Video Proceedings of people’s Tribunal, Lahore, February 
2014. 
33 The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (LAA) is the main legal setup used for acquiring private land for public use. The 
different provinces have made some modification and policy rules also apply.   
34 The distinction is important during protests and negotiations with government officials, but it is also repeated among 
movement participants. For instance, WB spoke about a protest outside the DC office in Turbat for flood affected 
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to get payments quickly. The payment on the basis of RAP had been a slow moving process. Even 
those classified as eligible for payment at 244 ft AMSL had to wait a few years after the disaster 
to receive compensation. As one affected person recounts how they got the payment. While he 
refers to a survey done within two or three months, this is likely to be the DNA survey, rather than 
the survey done by NESPAK in 2005 which formed the basis for payments to levels up to 264 feet 
AMSL. 
After the destruction [by Mirani dam backwater], the survey people came after one 
or two months to look at the damages to the houses. But many were left out. Some 
people left for Gwadar after receiving the payment. They got the payment, but not 
in a good way.  
What do you mean a good way? 
They didn’t receive enough money. They did not receive compensation for trees – 
only trees for 244 level but not up to 264 level.  There were five or six karezat at 
the 244 level [in Nodez], but we have not received any money for karezat and wells 
as yet [Dec 2014]. Only for some trees, but that is not enough. My family had 300 
trees but we got payment for only 30-40 trees. 
What happened after the survey, how did you get the money? 
We got a check from DC office. And deposited it in the bank. I don’t remember 
exactly, but it took at least 2 or 3 years. For getting this money. 
What did you do during this time? 
Sometimes we stayed with some people, at other times with others. With relatives, 
with friends, on rent. This created a lot of problems for them as well. There were 
problems of water and power supply everywhere as well.  
 
These issues of payment and the grievances around it are typical of what many people 
faced: the long wait, lower amounts of payment than actual damages, contention around the level 
at which damages must be compensated for, and the demands for compensation for trees and 
karezat.  
                                                 
people covered by a national news channel. When I asked if he could tell me more about the protest, WB notes that 
“No, they were flood affectees [نﺎﮔدز بﻼﯿﺳ], we are not flood affected.”  
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In addition to these, the key issue in the post-disaster period was a revision in the level 
from 264 to 271.4 feet AMSL, which is the level that the backwater reached. The locals of course 
had no way of knowing for sure what the level was. But their contention was based around which 
areas were included and previously excluded from the RAP plans.  
Thus in the post-disaster period, the key demands of the MMD revolve around 
compensation for houses, date-palm gardens, and local irrigation system. 35  In particular, the 
demands can be succinctly captured as: Provide compensation for all houses, fruit-trees, and 
karezat up to 271.4 level, and rehabilitate all karezat.  
Obtaining compensation entailed further revisions to the RAP. When the RAP surveys was 
first carried out, it was decided to pay compensation for houses and land up to 244 feet AMSL—
which is the maximum height of the spillway and the reservoir level. While some locals claim that 
payment for 244 level had been made before the construction of the dam, others dispute this by 
pointing out that the earlier payment was only for houses and not for the date-palm gardens and 
karezat at this level. The first revision to RAP were first made in 2005, as a result of organizing 
by the people, and the new level was fixed at 264 feet AMSL. The main point of contention with 
this revision was the omission of certain people from the survey list.  After the disaster though, it 
was officially acknowledge by the government that the flood had reached up to 271.4 AMSL. The 
task for the MMD was then to force the government to revise the RAP to update the level.  
                                                 
35 While I am describing the pre and post-disaster as two phases of a movement, the term movement is used loosely. 
There was no formal organization or even the same group of activists and networks. These two stages can be classified 
as separate and distinct, at least in one critical way. The first movement was led by local mautabar or respected 
individuals like Wajah and Barkat—who were also involved in party politics at some stage of their career. While some 
of the key individuals that were active during the post-disaster phase as well, new individuals joined and new 
collaborations were forged. One of the key activist during this later stage was not a resident of the affected areas, but 
a local from a nearby UC which is part of Turbat tehsil and was flooded, but not due to the backwater from Mirani 
dam. He was also able to bring new innovations by working with residents to make documentaries, and write a report, 
collaborating with an NGO that trains grassroots organizers and reaching out and building on the networks of activists 
and sympathizers in Quetta, Lahore and Islamabad. 
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In order to achieve these goals, the locals adopted various strategies. In line with the local 
ways of ensuring access to state, local elites played an important role by utilizing their connection 
with political parties and government officials. This was particularly useful for those who were 
already deemed eligible for compensation. For them, the issue was primarily delays in payment. 
As one activist noted:  
244 is the level of reservoir. The payment for this was given before the construction 
of the dam. But even this only happened after the local people protested by setting 
up a hunger strike camp [outside the DC office] and staged a sit-in.  
Why did it take so long for you to get compensated for?  
When water came at our areas, at the 264 level, the money was already there 
[released by the PCP, via province in the DC account]. But they were not giving. 
People were saying that this money was being held in the account for the sake of 
interest. [Interview, Mir] 
Others were not so lucky and they had to fight for getting their names in the list. But this 
was no simple task, as unlike the issue of payment which is in the hands of local district 
government, the survey lists had to be revised with approval from WAPDA and the Planning 
Commission in Lahore and Islamabad respectively. This put enormous burden on the members of 
the affected communities and local activists, who had to expend considerable resources, in terms 
of time, money, physical and emotional labor to approach and hold protests in Lahore and 
Islamabad (see section 6 for details). Sustained efforts by the MMD activists and their persistence 
over eight years have resulted in significant gains for affected people, but the movement had to 
engage in this particular politics of compensation. Their key strategies shifted somewhat in getting 
government officials to recognize their claims for compensation up to 271.4 feet AMSL.  
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Internal Dynamics and Conflicting Priorities 
The power and influence of various external and structural factors were significant in 
shaping the demands of the MMD movement, The context of violence and repression, 
development imperative, and soft repression worked together to silence other grievances from 
being voiced. The focus on demanding compensation became the defining feature of the MMD 
movement, as the politics of compensation for private houses and date gardens became the most 
viable demand. But locals at various points did speak about other forms of loss. Some of these 
grievances were not articulated because of the power dynamics internal to the movement, as the 
conflicting priorities within the community also shaped articulation. The different priorities of 
local elites were visible in both stages of mobilization against the dam–both during the 
construction of the dam and after the disaster and the subsequent demands for compensation.  
 Local activists claim that the Mirani dam could not have been built or the design of the 
dam would have been changed if the local elites and politicians had supported the efforts of local 
activists and movement participants. To be clear, the lines between the inside and outside of MMD 
movement are not clearly delineated and many local elites, big landlords, and political elites also 
participated in different ways in the political contestation against the Dam. But by and large, the 
MMD movement drew most of its members and activists from the lower and middle strata of the 
local communities.  
These activists identified the local political parties as part of the problem. There are two 
major political parties in Turbat: the National Party (NP) and the Balochistan National Party – 
Awami (BNP-A). When the dam was under construction BNP-A was in government and the 
Senator and Minister of Finance and Industry were from the Turbat tehsil. These were approached 
repeatedly by locals and activists, but they offered little support. This led to the strong belief that 
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the Mirani Dam project could not have gone ahead with the specific design had they support from 
their representatives.  
This dam would not have been built of [local Senator and MNAs] had supported 
us. But they didn’t. They said one thing to us and did another thing.  
While some acknowledge the support of NP leaders, opinions remain divided. Some of the 
activists were directly affiliated with NP and garnered support from the party’s local president as 
well as the Senator of the time and the current Chief Minister, Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch.  
Others were of the opinion that while NP had supported the cause, it had not done enough.36 
For instance, one local activist SR, notes:  
These elites are the ones who we approved the dam. You’d probably know this that 
the same party was in power when the dam was being constructed and the Chief 
Minister of Balochistan [Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch] belongs to the same party 
[National Party]. In 2000, the district Nazim who approved the dam was part of this 
party – they call him Shaheed [a martyr: the term here is used sarcastically].  
They wanted the dam to be built, because they were going to benefit financially in 
the command area, even though they would come and say that the dam has negative 
impact, but they still wanted to build the dam. [ Sangat Rafiq] 
Given the unequal landholding patterns, locals speak of differentiated and unequal 
expected benefits of the Mirani Dam project. Most of the land in the command area of the Dam 
was help by few large landowners, who were either themselves the class of elected representatives 
or closely affiliated with electoral politics. There was a huge incentives for the construction of 
Mirani dam, and resistance against the dam could put a dent in these plans.  Several activists who 
opposed the Mirani Dam project also had land in the downstream areas, but had a principled 
support for the potential problems in the upstream areas. The situation is complicated because 
many large landowners owned land both in the downstream and the upstream areas.  
                                                 
36 This view of lack of support becomes more prominent and more evident in the later phases of mobilization that are 
discussed in the next section. 
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The role of political and landholding elite was also significant in the post-disaster 
contestation around compensation. There are two ways in which this operated. First, instead of 
using an inclusive approach, local activists pointed out that some of the elites made claims that far 
exceeded the value of their properties. This caused significant delays as the government officials 
repeatedly conducted surveys in efforts to bring down the cost of paying compensation. 
Furthermore, activists had demanded that the issue of housing was significant for the deprived and 
poorer sections of the local communities, but the landlords were mostly concerned with getting 
compensation for their date trees.  
The delays caused by these internal conflicting positioning also created a fear among the 
local community members that if they deviated from the demand of compensation and asked for 
other things, such as schools, hospitals, community centers, then they would not even get the 
money for houses.  
In a way, these different priorities also point to the different and unequal ways in which 
disasters and displacement is experienced by different sections of society. The loss that is 
articulated by certain community members, such as the role of gift exchanges and the use of date 
trees for construction and ceremonial purposes is not a loss that is experienced by peoples of means 
are less vulnerable and are able to bounce back.  
Those who own the date-palm trees, are the political elites. They get the vote. They 
get the contracts. All the social, political, and economic benefits are with them. 
They are not hindered by financial problems, by poverty. Not having food at home 
is not their concern. Not being able to build a single room is not their problem.  Not 
being able to send their children to school or college is not an issue for them. They 
are doing well. They are affiliated with political parties. They are linked to all the 
economic elites. Politically and economically they are strong. 
Furthermore, some activists also noted that the big landholders also benefited from the 
disaster. People who were displaced needed land, and this created demand for some of the land 
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that was previously of no value. Most of this land was held by large landlords and politically 
influential groups. The disaster then benefitted them in multiple ways. As one activist put it: 
The elite own the land in the downstream command area, so they are benefitting 
from the dam, and they were involved in the building of the dam, indirectly. When 
they’d make public appearances they’d say it [that the dam was harmful and will 
have negative impact on local communities], but when they’d go to the offices [of 
government officials, bureaucracy] they’d tell them to build the dam because it 
would benefit them.  
They have been compensation for their date-palm trees and land in the upstream 
areas. And when the houses and lives of the poor and lower classes were destroyed 
and they needed land to move to, it was the land of the elites that was sold to them. 
So the upper classes, the 2%, have benefitted from all sides. They were responsible 
for the construction of the dam – indirectly, because they knew they were going to 
benefit from the development of the command area. 
The challenges faced by movement participants in confronting the state bureaucratic elites, 
the difficulty of making knowledge claims against the technical specifications of the dam design, 
and the difficulty in articulating complex losses were exaggerated when the most visible and 
prominent members of the local communities who had access to the corridors of power and 
influence did not support the wider claims of grievances, but rather were concerned with getting 
compensated for their own damaged property. Many activists claimed that the politicians and 
government officials also made several promises regarding restoring the collective and public 
goods, like rebuilding karezat, schools, and health facilities, but in meetings with officials these 
claims were never made or brought up. When some activists did raise the issue in some public 
meetings, they were shut down by others. These challenges also took toll on the activists, as the 
burden of articulating demands when multiple silencing processes were concurrently operating on 
them resulted in fatigue and a sense of hopelessness. Their articulations were shaped by these 
rationalities and emotions induced by the silencing operations.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION  
In the preceding sections of this paper, I have presented a detailed account of the grievances 
and demands of the communities and people affected by the Mirani dam movement. Most of my 
findings rely on the accounts presented by local activists and community members affiliated with 
the Mutasareene Mirani Dam (MMD) movement. Local challenges to Mirani dam began at first 
as an anti-dam struggle which sought to stop the construction of the dam and suggested several 
alternatives based on knowledge of local terrain and oral histories of the prior development plans. 
Most of these claims were silenced, and locals then shifted strategies and focused their energies 
on changing the design of the dam embankment and spillway in order to mitigate the harmful 
impact of the dam for upstream communities. More specifically, locals demanded a reduction in 
the maximum height of the dam and increase in the width of the spillway. These changes would 
ensure that the upstream areas will not face the risk of flooding due to the dam.  
As I have demonstrated, the broader structural factors and internal schisms ensured that the 
dam was constructed as planned. The experiences from earlier phases of mobilization were carried 
forward in the post-disaster stage and impacted the nature of demands, even when the worst fears 
of the community had materialized with large-scale destruction of upstream communities. The 
combination of the repressive political climate with an active an ongoing conflict, and the broader 
imperatives of growth, economic development, and military occupation provided the context in 
which the movement activist had to come forward with a set of demands and non-violent direct 
action to achieve those demands. In so doing, the MMD movement has overcome tremendous odds 
and achieved a great degree of success in getting the government to acknowledge that the 
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destruction was caused by the Mirani Dam and compensation must be paid to the affected people. 
As of writing of this paper, budgetary allocations have been made to pay compensation for houses 
and date-trees thought the affected people continue to wait for the actual payment of compensation.  
Yet the movement has been “successful” if we consider the articulated demands. As I have 
demonstrated that the underlying grievances are wide-ranging, complex, and will not be addressed 
by the payment of compensation. In fact, given the permanent displacement of community 
members, the future use of the compensation money is likely to stabilize negative outcomes by 
making permanent the loss of public, communal, collective, and intangible goods. The community 
members are aware of this disjuncture between grievances and demands, and have attempted at 
different stages to articulate a wider set of grievances. But they are faced a number of ways in 
which power operates to silence their articulations.  
The development imperative and the repressive nature of the Pakistani state constitute the 
two major factors impacting the political opportunity structure and the discursive realm of critique 
and contestation. Mirani dam was part of a broader set of “development” intervention in 
Balochistan, and was linked to the development of Gwadar sea port. Given the significance of this 
project, any change in the design would have led to serious implications for the future of Gwadar 
port, which would depend on the Mirani dam reservoir for water supply. These development 
imperatives is backed by the military might of the Pakistan army, and this has resulted in historical 
underdevelopment and ongoing dispossession in the region. The challenge then faced by 
movement participant was also to confront these structural constraints, which limits the 
possibilities of political action and articulations.  
In terms of the relation between knowledge and power, the power of the state and 
development actors to decide what gets classified as “credible knowledge” has resulting in 
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silencing of local knowledge claims based on experience and oral histories. Consultants, engineers, 
and technocrats appeared adamant that their survey studies and surveys gave them sufficient 
knowledge to design the dam suitable to local conditions, while the locals contended that their 
knowledge was based on both prior feasibilities studies by state officials, and an intimate and 
experiential knowledge of weather patterns, floods, and local geography. The 2007 backflow 
floods validated the local knowledge claims and proved the official technical designs and 
assessment as flawed, but unfortunately at great cost to the local communities.  
The movement and community also retains the memory of the earlier stages of silencing 
and these experiences impact their decisions about strategies and demands during later stages of 
mobilization. The climate of fear and hopelessness leads to restricted criticism of government 
projects, and demanding compensation presents itself as a safe and less radical option, even when 
its limits are acknowledged. The long delays and slow response from bureaucracy also creates 
concerns among local community members that demanding more could sabotage even the payment 
of compensation for houses and date gardens. Furthermore, at the level of local society, class 
differences prompted certain influential locals, big landlords, and politicians, to side with the 
government as long as interests were safeguarded. The dam promised development in the 
downstream areas, but the benefits were unevenly distributed. There was incentive for those with 
the means to develop land to support the construction of Mirani dam. The disaster also impacts 
different section of society differently, which result in different priorities towards demanding 
rehabilitation measures. For the influential, the disaster did not impact the kind of reliance on 
subsistence and gift-exchange relations or the reliance on collective goods such as the karezat that 
were at the foundation of the lifeworld of the lower strata of society. They were also able to 
rehabilitate their agriculture through investment in tube-wells. However, others were unable to 
81 
revive their agricultural lands, were displaced which disrupted their connections with the land and 
community – a disruption that had multifaceted impact. The issue of displacement has been central 
to the grievances of the community, but this issue was not raised or addressed because of different 
priorities.  
In the post disaster period, two other silencing operations were visible. The first is the 
assessment of what gets classified as loss in official damage and needs assessment in the post-
disaster context in general. I sought to demonstrate that these assessment rely on enumerating 
certain kinds of loss, most of which can be monetized and mapped onto the public or private goods 
and possession. Several key aspects of individual and collective trauma and loss are not addressed. 
These assessments are also linked to the design of financial compensation schemes, which might 
shape demands given compensation provide a formal and legal way (at least in theory) for 
demanding something. The politics of compensation is, I contend, a new form of emergent politics 
which can potentially be a subject for future study. For this paper, I have sought to show that the 
politics of compensation is, on the one hand, an outcome of the silencing operation on grievances 
and tactics and, on the other hand, offers the enabling potential for meeting some demands. It 
structures the menu of demands that could be voiced and heard by the government officials.  
Local activists also spoke about how they attempted to go beyond the politics of 
compensation, and attempted to mobilize around a more elaborate set of demands but faced 
resistance from certain community members. I argued noted that this form of schism is also 
induced by the broader factors, which creates a sense of hopelessness and anxieties among the 
locals who had been waiting for compensation for a very long period. Many among the affected 
population felt that demanding something more would jeopardize their chances of receiving even 
the compensation. In this sense, they were going for what they can get. But in going for what they 
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can get, and under all the silencing dynamics, MMD is forced to articulate a set of muted demands, 
that are not only disconnected with some of the underlying grievances and sense of loss, but are 
likely to stabilize negative outcome as well. 
In concluding, I propose some preliminary ideas about the significance of this distinction 
between grievances and demands and the focus on silencing process for the broader study of social 
movement studies. First, by distinguishing between grievances and demands we can have a better 
evaluation of the movement outcomes. If movements are only to be evaluated on the basis of the 
articulated demands, then that limits the degree to which we can speak about the underlying 
grievances that may be at the root of collective action. The degree to which it is important to 
distinguish between the two will vary from case to case. I have sought to demonstrate that in cases 
of displacement and dispossession induced by development and disaster, the disjuncture can be 
significant. The approach can then inform the study of a large number of movements in the global 
South as well as environmental movements in the global North. Second, my claim isn’t that the 
collective actors are “irrational” in articulating demands that are not consistent with their 
grievances. There’s a link between the demands and grievances. What I have sought to show is 
that under certain cases where silencing operations shape articulations of demands to a significant 
degree, the agency is limited by the structural factors and historical experiences of the movement 
participants. In that, the experiences in the earlier stages of movement participants are carried forth 
and impact the articulation of demands in the later stages as well. Third, conceiving silencing as 
an operation of power allows for understanding how concepts such as hegemony or quiescence 
continue to operate on movement – beyond the simple issue of action and inaction, silencing has 
the power to shape articulation themselves. This gives a way to empirically study the operation of 
power. Fourth, I have argued for the need to study the silencing operations. While social movement 
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scholars, particularly from the framing perspective, have looked at the strategic choices and the 
external factors (media etc) and how these shape the demands of a movement – the overriding 
concern has been with explaining the impact of framing on mobilization, recruitment, or success. 
In some sense, my works seeks to both extend and challenge this approach. Instead of concerns 
with success or failure of demands in mobilizing, I have taken mobilization as a given – which is 
true for all forms of collective action. This avoids the pitfall of post-hoc explanations of the success 
of a “mobilizing frame”. And finally, the focus on the discursive and institutional factors, the 
“political opportunity” structures, also allows for a comparative study of movements to raise 
questions about the conditions and particular histories in which certain demands can be articulated 
more readily compared to other context. This final point is also of significance to scholars of social 
movements who wish to use their intellectual labor to provide ways of thinking about the strategies 
and tactics that activists can adopt. Given knowledge about the potential silencing operations, 
movement participants can have a better sense of the kinds of interventions that might be need to 
unsilenced certain silences.  
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APPENDIX A – DNA NOTES 
Source: World Bank. 2007. Pakistan - Cyclone and floods 2007 : preliminary damage and needs assessment - 
Balochistan and Sindh. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/10/16449395/pakistan-
cyclone-floods-2007-preliminary-damage-needs-assessment--brbalochistan-sindh 
Housing damage: “71,596 housing units were completely destroyed which include 41,718 
and 29,878 respectively in Balochistan and Sindh, and represent 6% each of the total housing stock 
in the affected districts of Balochistan and Sindh. Approximately 85% of the houses … located in 
areas classified under the 1998 census as rural. The total value (replacement cost, not depreciated) 
of the housing lost in the affected areas is US$76.4million, based on a typical building plan and 
unit material and labor costs. ” (p11) 
Livelihood: “a total of around 0.5 million jobs are estimated to be lost, which amount to 
be nearly 30 percent of total employment before the cyclone and flooding hit the areas. This, in 
turn, implies that the population affected by employment losses of household members is at least 
1.7 million. The employment losses are highly concentrated in the agricultural sector which 
constitutes about 80 percent of total employment losses.” 
Agriculture: “The direct damages to agriculture sector, which include losses of harvested 
and standing crops, perished animals, partially or fully destroyed irrigation infrastructure and other 
assets are estimated at Rs. 13.2 billion, of which 76% occurred in Balochistan and 24% in Sindh. 
The crop sub-sector suffered most with Rs. 6.0 billion of losses (45.3% of total agriculture losses), 
followed by irrigation (34.3%), livestock (19.2%), and fisheries (1.2%). The indirect losses 
representing the lost incomes of future crop, livestock, and fisheries productions due to disruptions 
caused by flood and cyclone are estimated at Rs. 5.7 billion, 77.0% of which occurred in 
Balochistan and 23.0% in Sindh.” (13) 
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 “Psychological shock and trauma: The shock and trauma of a natural calamity is likely 
to affect a considerable number of people, particularly children (especially single parent children 
and orphans), pregnant women and elderly. They would require counseling and emotional support 
to overcome the shock and trauma. ” (p17) 
 “Impact on water resources: The floods have caused significant damages to water 
resources in general. Most of the water systems, including surface and ground water, were 
damaged to varying levels thus impairing their use both for drinking and irrigation purposes.” 
(p18) 
The space provided in the Annexes is also telling. Here’s the list 
Annex -1: Economic Assessment (11 pages) 
Annex-2: Livelihood (9 pages) 
Annex-3: Governance (7 pages) 
Annex-4: Hazard Risk Management (10 pages) 
Annex-5: Social Impact (4 pages, out of which one page is a checklist/questionnaire, page 
66-67; this interestingly lists some of the elements that I am referring to) 
Annex-6: Environmental impact (3 pages) 
A further 40-50 pages are dedicated to different sectors – “social impacts” and 
“environment” are not discussed. 
The annex on social impact begins by stating that there is little data for assessing impact 
on vulnerable groups, and the impact assessment is based on “anecdotal evidence and post-disaster 
experience of similar nature.” 
It then goes on to talk about “security for women and girls”, noting issues of privacy and 
mobility of women, even in relief camps;  “unattended children,” which is not seen as a big issue 
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due to low numbers; “single-headed households”, which recommends collecting more district-
level data; “shock and trauma”, which is: 
“Psychological Shock and Trauma: The shock and trauma of a natural calamity of this 
magnitude is likely to affect a significant number of people, especially children, pregnant women 
and elderly. They would require counseling and emotional support to overcome their shock and 
trauma. It is important to pay special attention to the emotional and psychological well-being of 
these vulnerable groups so that they may fully recover from the trauma. ” 
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